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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1 
The government wage bill represents a significant share of total public expenditures. Given its relevance, 
developments of government wages are likely to produce significant effects on the whole labour market, 
public finances and the overall economy. This paper looks at the interlinkages and interactions between 
government wages and the labour market. 
A proper understanding of the interactions between government wages and labour market conditions for 
the private sector is currently of high relevance in the EU, as a number of Member States are facing the 
challenge of redressing public finances, while at the same time rebalancing their economies, and dealing 
with rising unemployment.  
The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, it discusses the peculiarities of the objectives and constraints of 
the government as an employer and describes government wage formation across EU countries, looking 
at the main features of existing institutional settings and arrangements, the actors involved, and 
established practices. This is essential to better understand not only wage outcomes in the government 
sector, but also the scope for adjustment in the wage bill and the potential for and mechanism of wage 
spill-overs to the private sector. 
Second, it compares the level of public wages with those in the private sector. The analysis aims at 
identifying the possible existence of “wage premia”, which are not explained by skills or other individual 
characteristics. As compared with existing analyses, the aim is to estimate wage premia for all EU 
countries in years for which survey data are available both before and after the crisis, and to discuss cross-
country differences in wage premia in light of relevant country characteristics. 
Third, the paper analyses the dynamic interactions between government and private wages. Short-term 
interactions are estimated by means of a structural VAR for all EU countries for which sufficiently long 
time series are available. Compared with existing analyses, dynamic interactions are analysed across the 
EU for time series comprising the post-crisis period. In addition, the long-term relation between 
manufacturing and government wage levels is analysed across a panel of EU countries in a co-integration 
framework. Results are discussed with reference to country-level structural and institutional 
characteristics that may influence the dynamic interactions between wages in the government and private 
exposed sector.  
A number of relevant findings from the analysis can be summarised as follows: 
• Wage setting institutions and practices in the government sector vary considerably across the EU 
along several dimensions, including the presence, scope and breadth of collective bargaining, the 
degree of centralization, the rights of governments and the modes of their representation, and union 
density. A key distinction is between countries in which government wages are mostly set by 
legislative decision and those where they are set by collective bargaining. While Eastern European 
and some Southern European countries tend to follow under the former category, Anglo-Saxon, 
Nordic and Continental European countries plus Italy belong to the latter.  
• Average compensations per employee in the government sector are normally higher than in the private 
sector because the composition of employment is characterised by a higher incidence of high-skill 
employees. Even after controlling for the composition of employment, an hourly wage premium for 
the public sector is nonetheless observed in some countries (i.e., Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, 
Portugal, Belgium, Italy), while negative public wage premia are generally observed in Eastern 
European countries. 
• Correlation analysis indicates that the public wage premium is linked to job security in the private 
sector as measured by EPL indexes, possibly because higher compensations are needed to make 
public employment attractive when private employment is strongly protected. It also appears that 
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wage premia are more moderate in countries where the government sector employs a relatively large 
share of the labour force, most likely in light of the stronger bargaining power of the public employer.  
• Structural VAR analysis permits to quantify the short-term interactions between government and 
private wage dynamics and identify potential direct and indirect channels of transmission. Results 
indicate that while private wages normally exhibit a significant response to government wages, 
government wages are much less reactive to shocks in private sector wages. This evidence would be 
consistent with government sector wage leadership in a number of EU countries. The impact of 
government wage shocks on private sector compensations is estimated to be strong especially in Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, France.  
• A negative correlation is observed across countries between the response of private wages to 
government wage shocks and the extent of trade openness, corroborating the view that high exposure 
to trade reduces the scope for deviations of labour costs from those of foreign competitors, thereby 
raising the resilience of private sector wages to shocks originating from the government sector. 
• Spillovers originating from strong dynamics in the wages paid in the non-tradable sector, notably the 
government sector, have been mentioned among the drivers of competitiveness losses in some EU and 
euro-area countries before the crisis. With a view to shed light and qualify this hypothesis, the relation 
between government compensations and labour costs in the tradable sector is analysed by means of a 
co-integration framework, which allows analysing long-run effects on wage levels. Across the whole 
panel of available EU countries, there is evidence of a significant long-term relation between 
government and manufacturing wage levels. However, by separating the analysis for countries with a 
relatively large and a relatively small government sector it appears that this long-run relation is much 
stronger for the former set of countries. It also appears that wage setting modalities may play a role for 
the long-run relation between government and manufacturing wages: in countries where government 
wages are to a greater extent determined via collective bargaining, manufacturing wages are more 
strongly linked to productivity.  
• Recent years have been characterised by unprecedented episodes of wage restraint in the public sector 
and by a discontinuation of established collective bargaining practices in government wage setting in 
response to the emergency situation of public finances in a number of EU countries. The analysis 
shows that when dynamics in government wages are mainly driven by fiscal consolidation concerns, 
co-movements between government and private wages tend to be weaker, although a strong link is 
still found in countries with a large government size.  
Limitations in the analysis need not be neglected, notably linked to limited availability of statistics on 
government compensations, imperfect cross-country comparability of data, and robustness of results with 
respect to the methodologies employed.  
Despite the above limitations, the analysis sheds light on a number of elements that may deserve further 
attention in ongoing policy discussions. 
For its sheer size as an employer, the government has a strong influence on the overall labour market. The 
analysis presented in this paper confirms that such influence can be quantitatively relevant and persistent, 
notably in countries less open to international trade and where government employment represents a high 
share of total employment. 
In the years before the crisis, in a number of EU countries, imprudent and sub-optimal wage setting 
practices in the government sector may have been at the source not only of mounting public finance 
problems and fiscal pro-cyclicality in good times, but could have contributed to saw the seeds of 
competitiveness losses spreading to the tradable sector and feeding growing external imbalances. The 
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response to the current account and public finance crisis that materialised in a number of EU countries 
after 2008 included in some cases measures to correct government wage trends that are dictated by 
emergency considerations and are of unprecedented severity, often implying a discontinuation of 
established wage setting practices. 
• From a forward-looking perspective, wage setting practices in the government sector should aim at 
avoiding the mistakes of the past while creating the conditions for enhanced public sector efficiency 
and preserving fiscal and macroeconomic stability.  
• The documented presence of non-negligible public wage premia is a matter of concern as this may 
imply a persistently sub-optimal supply of skilled labour to the private sector, with consequences in 
terms of competitiveness and growth potential. While avoiding the emergence of such unjustified 
wage premia is certainly an objective in its own right, in light of recent pay freezes and cuts in a 
number of EU countries, looking forward it is also important to prevent the risk of excessively low 
pay in the government sector for key occupations and to ensure the minimum necessary quantity and 
quality of public services. From a public management perspective, adequate information on 
differences in the pay structure between the government and private sector, including wage premia 
estimates, could help from this viewpoint. 
• From a dynamic viewpoint, the current retrenchment of government wage growth was a necessary 
ingredient of the policy strategy followed by EU countries that were mostly concerned with the debt 
crisis. Wage moderation in the public sector was functional not only to the reduction of fiscal deficits, 
but, in light of the relevant repercussions on the private sector labour market, also to the preservation 
of employment and the improvement of competitiveness in the private sector. While subdued 
government dynamics may still be needed looking forward in some EU countries, it is desirable that 
wage setting in the public sector exits from emergency mode, with a view to improve practices on a 
sustainable basis and better incorporate longer-term considerations.  
• In the above respect, an adequate balance will have to be found between the efficiency gains permitted 
by better aligning government pay to productivity and labour market conditions and the need to ensure 
the respect of fiscal targets. While bargaining-based, decentralised wage setting modalities are more 
likely to deliver on the front of the alignment of wages with labour market conditions, the 
maintenance of adequate control from the centre on the overall government wage bill helps the 
achievement of budgetary targets. Further work to assess alternative ways to achieve a satisfactory 
trade-off between these objectives and evaluate best practices across EU countries seems deserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
General government employment in the EU 
accounts for a considerable share of the labour 
force. Given its relevance, developments of 
government wages are likely to produce significant 
effects on the whole labour market, public finances 
and the overall economy. This paper looks at the 
interlinkages and interactions between government 
wages and the labour market.  
A good understanding of the interactions between 
government wages and the labour market is of 
uttermost importance in the current context where 
a number of EU countries are at the same time 
consolidating public finances, rebalancing their 
economies, and dealing with rising unemployment.  
Because of its sheer size, wage conditions set by 
the government sector may impact on incentives in 
the private sector as well. For instance, the same 
type of labour may have a higher remuneration in 
the government sector, thus inducing a shift of 
resources out of the private sector. The impact on 
incentives has microeconomic implications, as it 
affects for the allocation of labour and skills and 
overall economic efficiency, as well as 
macroeconomic implications on the front of 
adjustment and growth performance. 
From a dynamic viewpoint, changes in 
government compensations may spill over to the 
private sector, with implications for employment 
and competitiveness. In particular, strong 
dynamics in the government wage bill may crowd 
out private sector employment, inflate labour cost 
conditions, and lead to competitiveness losses 
(e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Alesina et al., 
2002; Ardagna, 2004). 
Dynamic interactions may be present in the 
opposite direction as well, from the private to the 
government sector. Most notably, wage growth 
linked to productivity improvements in the private 
sector will inevitablymay spill over to the 
government sector due to labour mobility, which 
may imply a reduced capacity of governments to 
keep wage growth under control. 
The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, it 
discusses the peculiarities, the objectives and the 
constraints of the government as an employer and 
describes government wage formation across EU 
countries, looking at the main features of existing 
institutional settings and arrangements, the actors 
involved, and established practices. This is 
essential to better understand not only wage 
outcomes in the government sector, but also the 
scope for adjustment in the wage bill and the 
potential for and mechanism of wage spill-overs to 
the private sector. 
Second, it compares the level of public wages with 
those in the private sector. The analysis aims at 
identifying the possible existence of “wage 
premia”, which are not explained by skills or other 
observable individual characteristics. As compared 
with existing analyses, the aim is to estimate wage 
premia for all EU countries in years for which 
survey data are available both before and in the 
first years of the crisis, and to discuss cross-
country differences in wage premia in light of 
relevant country characteristics. 
Third, the paper analyses the dynamic interactions 
between government and private wages. Short-
term interactions are estimated by means of a 
structural VAR for all EU countries for which 
sufficiently long time series are available. As 
compared with existing analyses, dynamic 
interactions are analysed across the EU for time 
series comprising the post-crisis period. In 
addition, the long-term relation between private 
and government wage levels is analysed across a 
panel of EU countries in a co-integration 
framework. Results are discussed with reference to 
country-level structural and institutional 
characteristics that may influence the dynamic 
European Commission 
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interactions between wages in the government and 
private sector.  
Throughout the paper, the analysis refers to a 
definition of the public sector coinciding with the 
general government, with the exception of the 
assessment of the wage premium: in this case, 
survey data makes available a different distinction, 
namely that between employees working in entities 
with majority of public ownership and those 
working in the private sector. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. The next section reviews main aspects of 
wage setting in the government sector across EU 
countries. Section 3 illustrates some basic facts on 
government wages and employment in EU 
countries. Section 4 is devoted to the comparison 
of wages between the public and private sector by 
means of the estimation of wage premia. Section 5 
focuses on the dynamic interaction between wages 
in the government and private sector. Section 6 
concludes and discusses policy implications. 
2. MAIN ASPECTS OF WAGE SETTING IN THE 
GOVERNMENT SECTOR  
2.1. The government as an employer 
The government has been for long the single 
largest employer in any developed economy. The 
long-term expansion of the government both in 
terms of expenditure and employment has been 
more on account of an expansion of the welfare 
state, i.e. the provision by the government of 
public goods and of merit goods, risk sharing and 
other income redistribution than on an expansion 
of sovereign functions, which used to be the 
backbone of a public administration.  
Many of the government jobs are comparable to 
private sector ones and, as it is the case in some 
countries, some of those services can indeed be 
supplied by private suppliers even if heavily 
funded by the government, with education and 
health services being among the finest examples. 
Thus, in the presence of activities that may be 
performed both by public and private employees, 
spillovers linked to mobility between the two 
sectors are likely to occur. 
Moreover, for a number of reasons, the 
government as an employer is different than a 
private company. 
• First, the government supplies a very particular 
type of goods and services. The provision of 
public goods (including sovereignty tasks like 
defence, public order, judiciary, or regulation) 
or of merit goods takes usually place in a 
monopolistic regime with little room for 
market based competition. For this reason, the 
elasticity of demand for government services is 
likely to be low, which also implies a relatively 
low wage elasticity of labour demand.  (1)  
• Second, the objectives, incentives and 
constraints faced by decision makers in the 
government sector make the government a 
"one-of-a-kind" employer. Whilst the objective 
of a market-based employer is profit 
maximisation, politicians and bureaucrats may 
have a different objective function like the 
maximisation of social welfare (Gregory and 
Borland, 1999; Forni and Giordano, 2003) or 
that of maximising the chances of being re-
elected (Alesina et al, 2001) or the amount of 
resources under the control of bureaucracies 
(e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1958). Also the 
constraints faced by public wage-setters are 
different: whereas market-based employers and 
decision makers are constrained by demand for 
the service they supply, politicians and 
bureaucrats may decide on the levels of 
government service provision, thereby 
affecting government labour demand directly, 
but are constrained by the government's fiscal 
space. 
• Third, the government is likely to exert a strong 
influence on private sector not only in light of 
its sheer size as employer, but also because it 
acts as a legislator on the framework 
conditions under which labour relations occur, 
including wage setting. It can also impact on 
overall wage developments in the broad 
economy with a direct role when it comes to 
setting the statutory minimum wage and to 
promoting tripartite agreements or other kind 
                                                          
(1) See, e.g., Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983), Freeman (1986). 
However, it also needs to be taken into account that some 
merit goods or transfers in kind are supplied by the 
government in competition with the private sector (e.g., 
health or childcare). 
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of agreements against which actual wage 
decisions are taken in the private as well as in 
the government sector. 
2.2. Industrial relations in the government 
sector across EU countries: main 
characteristics 
Wage determination in the government sector can 
differ substantially from standard bargaining in the 
private sector. This is not only because the 
government is a different type of employer, but 
also because the union structure and the 
institutional environment in which wage setting 
occurs do differ from those of the private sector. 
Moreover, the government employment 
relationship can differ from that of private sector 
employees. Indeed, in most EU countries, a special 
legal status exists for civil servants, with 
differences concerning issues like protection 
against dismissal and certain other rights and 
obligations of the parties.  
Differences across EU countries are found first of 
all for what concerns the rights recognised to 
public employees in terms of collective bargaining 
and strike. 
In a number of EU countries, the rights of 
association, and especially of collective action and 
of strike, are more limited for public sector 
employees than for private sector employees, as 
Graphs 1 and 2 indicate. 
Graph 1: Right of association: private and government 
sectors, 2011 
0
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Right of Association, Private sector
Right of Association, Government sector  
(1) A value of 3, 2, 1 or 0 means: right of association, right of 
association with minor restrictions, right of association with 
major restrictions, and no right of association, respectively. 
The indicator refers to 2010 in the case of  
Bulgaria and Romania.  
Source: Visser (2013). 
A more restrictive setting for government 
employees results in part from the view inspiring 
national legislation that there should not be an 
opposition between the sovereign interests of the 
government and those of its agents and employees 
(Bordogna, 2007).  (2) 
Graph 2: Right to strike: private and government 
sectors, 2011 
0
1
2
3
RO U
K IE EL ES FR IT CY LT HU M
T N
L FI SE CZ PT S
I
BE DE SK LU BG D
K EE LV AT P
L
Right of Strike, Private sector
Right of Strike, Government sector  
(1) A value of 3, 2, 1 or 0 means: right to strike, right to strike 
with minor restrictions, right to strike with major restrictions, 
and no right to strike, respectively. The indicator refers to 
2010 in the case of Bulgaria and Romania. 
Source: Visser (2013). 
Those differences may be more muted than they 
appear, as often the limitations are not extended to 
the whole population of government employees, 
but mostly for those carrying sovereign functions 
in areas like police, armed forces or the judiciary 
(in some cases, also senior officials), which are not 
supplied by the private sector. (3) 
The right to collective bargaining for government 
employment seems also somewhat more 
constrained than in the private sector (Graph 3). 
Only for a minority of EU member states can 
collective bargaining rights of government 
employees be considered literally comparable to 
those of the private sector, so that the level playing 
field is tilted more to the employer side as far as 
bargaining and collective action is concerned. 
                                                          
(2) In many cases, these special obligations are compensated 
by a special status for government employees, often with 
higher level of employment protection and possibly other 
benefits. 
(3) See, for instance, Warneck and Clauwaert (2009) for a 
survey of rights of association and of collective action in 
the public sector in EU countries. 
European Commission 
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Graph 3: Right of collective bargaining: private and 
government sectors, 2011 
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Right of Collective Bargaining, Private sector
Right of Collective Bargaining, Government sector  
(1) A value of 3, 2, 1 or 0 means: right to collective 
bargaining, right to collective bargaining with minor 
restrictions, right to collective bargaining with major 
restrictions, and no right to collective bargaining, 
respectively. The indicator refers to 2010 in the case of 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
Source: Visser (2013). 
The incentives for strike and industrial action can 
differ between the government and the private 
employer, and this may also underpin differences 
in legislation. Whereas the strike will reduce the 
revenues of the private employer, in the case of the 
government that is less likely to be an issue as the 
government is by and large financed by tax 
revenues. Obviously, these different costs could 
result in different bargaining outcomes.  
Graph 4: Trade union density in private and 
government sectors in some EU countries (% of 
sector workforce), 2000-2011 
 
(1) Data refer to the most recent observation available over 
2000-2011. 
Source: Masso and Espenberg (2012), Visser (2013). 
In most EU countries (4), affiliation with trade 
unions is higher or even much higher in the 
government sector than in the private sector, even 
                                                          
(4) Similar patterns of visibly higher membership in the 
government sector relative to the private one are also found 
in other economies in Europe and elsewhere, like the cases 
of Canada, Japan or the USA; see, e.g. Blanchflower 
(2007) and Visser (2013). 
if that difference varies widely across countries 
(Graph 4 and Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Trade union density in central government 
< 15% 15-25% 25-40% 40-55% 55-70% > 75%
CZ FR BG BE AT DK
EE HU DE IE FI
LV NL IT RO
LT PT UK
PL
SK  
Source: Bordogna (2007). 
 
Possible explanations for a higher union membership 
rate in the government sector are as follows. 
• Higher union affiliation is normally found in 
bigger firms and employers. (5) This may be 
driven by the fact that the average costs of 
organising labour can fall as the size of the 
employer increases. Big employers may also 
benefit more from having a union to negotiate 
with, as that may allow lower transaction costs 
than bargaining individually with a plethora of 
employees.  
• Given the dominance of structured career and 
pay schedules in the government sector, there 
is less room for differentiation and for bilateral 
employee-employer negotiations. The fact that 
individual gains or wage differentiation are 
difficult to obtain create incentives for union 
activity and collective action (European 
Commission, 2013).  
• Given the specificity of some of the 
government posts and their inexistence in the 
private sector, the human capital that 
government employees acquire through 
experience may not be rewarded by a potential 
employer in the private sector, thereby 
reducing the outside options of government 
employees and increasing the bargaining power 
of the government. This may as well lead to 
higher unionisation in the government sector. 
• In addition, unions may be more popular in the 
government sector as unions may influence the 
government through the ballot power as 
workers are also voters and thereby can 
                                                          
(5) See Schnabel (2013) for a recent review of empirical 
literature on potential determinants of union membership. 
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influence the choice of government decision 
makers (e.g., Checchi and Lucifora, 2002).  
Graph 6: Evolution of union density in government and 
private sectors in EU countries between 1995-
2000 and 2007-2011 
 
(1)Change in union density is calculated as the change in 
union density between 2007-2011and 1995-2000 as a 
percentage of the average union density over 1995-2000. 
Source: Visser (2013). 
Some trends characterise the evolution over time of 
some features of industrial relations in the 
government sector.  
• First, rights of collective bargaining in the 
market and government sector have been 
increasing over the last few decades mostly in 
the new Member States during the transition 
period, often leaving the gap in favour of the 
market sector unaffected. But rights of 
collective bargaining in the government sector 
have increased also in France and the 
Netherlands, and since the 1990s in Greece, 
closing in the latter two cases the initial 
difference with the market sector (Graph 5).  
• Second, against a background of a general 
trend towards falling union density in most EU 
countries since the early nineties, union 
membership has been more resilient in the 
government sector, with some noteworthy 
SE
FI
DK
AT
UK
DE
NL
ES
-35%
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
-35% -25% -15% -5% 5%
Change in union density in government sector
Change
in union density in private 
Graph 5: Rights of collective bargaining across EU countries, 1980-2011 
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(1)Rights of collective bargaining in the market sector are defined and classified as follows: 3 = yes; 2 = yes with minor 
restrictions (e.g., registration, thresholds); 1 = yes with major restrictions (e.g., monopoly union, government authorization, 
limitations on content, major groups excluded); 0 = no. Rights of collective bargaining in the government sector are defined 
and classified as follows: 3 = yes; 2 = yes with minor restrictions (e.g., registration, thresholds, only military, judiciary and policy 
excluded – as per ILO convention); 1 = yes with major restrictions (e.g., monopoly union, government authorization, 
limitations on content, major groups excluded); 0 = no. 
Source: Visser (2013) 
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exceptions (e.g., Spain and the Netherlands) 
(see Graph 6). 
2.3. Wage setting modalities in the 
government sector across EU countries 
A key dimension of wage setting in the 
government sector is the mechanism for decision-
making. Two main regimes can be identified.  
• First, wages are mainly determined on the basis 
of collective bargaining.  
• Second, wages are determined on the basis of 
unilateral decision by the government.  
Table 2 summarises and characterises the wage 
setting process across EU countries on the basis of 
existing studies. It shows that in only slightly less 
than half of the countries does wage setting in the 
government sector take place predominantly on the 
basis of collective bargaining. (6)  
The differences between the two regimes are often 
nuanced, as it can be difficult to distinguish not 
only between bargaining, consultations and 
outright unilateral decisions, but also between the 
letter of the legislation and established practices. In 
many cases, the effective setting combines 
elements of the two regimes.  
The government may decree on wages but only 
after extended consultations with an implicit or 
explicit agreement with workers' representatives 
(e.g., Austria). In addition, in certain countries, the 
outcomes of collective bargaining may need 
confirmation by government or parliament (e.g., 
Luxembourg, Hungary or Malta). These cases are 
classified in Table 2 as predominantly based on 
decision rather than bargaining, albeit decision by 
the government may be less unilateral than in other 
systems.  
In other cases wage renewals can be the outcome 
of proposals by bodies that are independent from 
the government and including employees’ 
representatives, with the UK's pay review bodies 
being one of the examples. For the sake of 
                                                          
(6) The de jure classification was followed herewith, as the 
practises may vary a lot more, not only across countries but 
also over time and as a function of specific agents or 
decision makers. 
categorisation, these cases are considered as 
predominantly bargaining in Table 2. (7) 
 
Table 2: Main dimensions of government wage setting 
in EU countries 
Predominant regime of 
wage determination: 
Bargaining (B) / Decision 
(D)
De jure indexation to 
past inflation?
De jure centralisation of 
wage updates across  
government sector?
BE B Yes No
BG D No No
CZ D No No
DK B No No
DE B No No
EE D No No
IE B No Yes
EL D No Yes
ES D No No 
FR D No Yes 
IT B No No
CY B Suspended Yes
LV D No No
LT D No No
LU D Yes Yes
HU D No Yes
MT D Yes Yes
NL B No No
AT D No No
PL D No No
PT D No Yes
RO D No Yes
SI B Suspended Yes
SK D No No
FI B No No
SE B No No
UK B No No  
Source: Bechter and Brandl (2013); Bordogna (2007); 
Bordogna and Pedersini (2013); EIRO (2009); EPSU (2009); 
Giordano et al (2011); Glassner (2010); Masso and 
Espenberg (2012); O'Connell (2012); OECD (2011). 
 
At the same time, it is possible that negotiations 
come close to unilateral determination under 
certain conditions. That is the case when the 
government enters negotiations with a well-
defined, enforceable and credible budget 
constraint, notably the approved budgetary 
allocation for the wage bill in the budget law for 
the relevant period of wage application. This was 
the case in a number of countries during the crisis: 
the seriousness of the fiscal distress led to a de-
facto suspension of established practices based on 
a bargaining model (European Commission, 2013). 
The presence of automatic or de-jure wage 
indexation is a second dimension along which 
wage setting modalities in the government sector 
can be classified. Statutory indexation concerns at 
present a minority of countries (Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Malta), with government wages 
                                                          
(7) This is also the understanding of Glassner (2010), who 
considers the case of the UK 'pay review bodies' a form of 
de facto negotiation as unions can put forward their 
recommendations and demands. Note that not all wages in 
UK's public sector are determined by 'pay review bodies'. 
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indexation rules largely coinciding with those for 
the private sector wages in those cases.  
A third dimension of wage setting is the extent to 
which there is centralisation across levels of 
government. Over the last two decades, 
government wage setting systems across Europe 
were concerned by a trend towards increasingly 
decentralised pay negotiations and a substitution of 
automatic, collective, seniority-based pay 
adaptation systems with more selective and 
discretionary systems based on merit and 
performance. The trend, analogous to the one 
taking place in the private sector, is mainly 
explained by the need to ensure the adaptation of 
pay structures to the productivity impact of 
technological and organisational change.  
Table 2 summarises also information on whether 
or not there is very significant centralisation of the 
decision for the whole government sector across 
EU countries.  
It is shown that only in a minority of EU Member 
States government wage setting is de jure 
centralised to a significant degree. (8) A first and 
dominant dimension of decentralisation concerns 
differentiation in wage setting along the different 
government subsectors. The best example is when 
decentralisation is the result of a federal or 
decentralised structure of the state like in Belgium, 
Germany or Spain, although separate negotiations 
for central government on the one hand and 
regional and local government subsectors on the 
other hand can also be found in other, non-federal 
EU countries.  
A further pattern of decentralisation is linked to 
administrative and managerial autonomy and the 
growing importance of more autonomous bodies 
and agencies playing a role in wage determination 
(European Commission, 2013). The UK is perhaps 
the most significant example on this respect. 
Wage setting decentralisation can be combined 
with different degrees of coordination among 
different government players. In a number of EU 
countries, negotiations for local governments are 
centralised and carried out at national level (EPSU, 
                                                          
(8) A relevant distinction is that between de- jure and de-facto 
wage setting centralisation, the latter being affected also by 
the extent of coordination among bargaining parties. 
2009). Other cases where the government is 
represented by a single negotiating entity include 
negotiations for employees of the German länder 
until recently or the existence of a single 
negotiation agency in Italy (ARAN).  
Wage setting coordination in some countries is the 
outcome of a two-tier wage setting system 
whereby wage increases are partially set at central 
level and partially by local administrations. In a 
number of countries, insufficient coordination of 
decentralised wage setting at local level coupled 
with the issue of “vertical imbalance” (i.e., local 
expenditures financed from the centre) translated 
into excessive wage dynamics at lower levels of 
government, leading to a response by the central 
government aimed at enhancing control (e.g., Italy, 
Spain). 
2.4. A clustering of government wage 
setting systems across the EU 
EU countries could be clustered in five main 
groups as far as size (9) and government wage 
setting institutions are concerned. (10)  
Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 
which present prevalence of collective bargaining, 
room for decentralisation even if with strong 
elements of coordination at national level 
including the private sector. Collective bargaining 
in the public and private sectors share many 
characteristics. In these countries, union density in 
the government sector is very high and public 
employment rates are the highest in the EU.  
Anglo-Saxon countries: the UK, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Cyprus, which all share various 
characteristics with the previous group but in a less 
intense and non-uniform way. In the UK, wage 
setting is more scattered and decentralised with a 
role for bargaining but also an important role for 
pay review bodies. Ireland has similarities with the 
Nordic group, notably high union density in the 
public sector, a strong element of bargaining but in 
a centralised setting, but public employment is less 
important. Italy presents a dominance of 
bargaining and still significant union density and 
                                                          
(9) Figures on the share of government employment are 
discussed in section 3.  
(10) The classification is partly based on European Commission 
(2013). 
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the share of public to total employment is lower 
than average. The Netherlands is characterised by 
a decentralised bargaining setting but with lower 
union density than the countries listed before. 
Cyprus can be classified in this group given the 
prevalence of bargaining and some 
decentralisation. 
Central European countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg, and to a certain extent, 
also Slovenia, with intermediate levels of trade 
union density, elements of collective bargaining 
but also of government role up to the point of 
having the possibility of unilateral determination 
of wage in some cases, with the intensity of the 
two aspects varying across the countries of the 
group. Decentralisation is foreseen but may not 
always be entrenched in common practice. Levels 
of union density are intermediate. Public 
employment rates are close to EU average.  
Southern Europe: France, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal, with a leading role of the government, 
often in a centralised way (except in Spain). Union 
density varies considerably inside the group, being 
visibly high in Greece. Public employment rates 
are close but below the EU average (except in 
France, where it is above the average). Also Malta 
could be classified in this group. 
Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia, with somewhat less room 
for collective action and with a leading role for the 
government. Some room for decentralisation 
seems to exist, especially for the local government, 
but seems to be less relevant than in other groups. 
Government sector union density is low or very 
low in most of the countries. Public employment 
rates are below the EU average. 
3. GENERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT 
AND WAGES IN THE EU: SOME BASIC 
FACTS 
3.1. Government employment 
Cross-country analysis of public employment and 
wages is impaired by issues of comparability 
because the boundaries of the public sector, which 
typically embraces general government plus 
publicly owned enterprises, vary from one country 
to another. The use of smaller aggregates helps 
improving cross-country comparability but it does 
not solve problems of country- and time-coverage. 
The focus here is on general government. Figures 
on general government employment and wages 
stem from the System of National Accounts (SNA) 
and refer to public offices at all levels of 
government, non-market publicly owned hospitals, 
schools, and social security organizations. General 
government data do not include public or quasi-
public corporations, even when all the equity of 
such corporations is owned by government units. 
One alternative way of capturing the public sector 
is to use the classification by economic activity 
rather than by sector. (11) Some activities are 
exclusively performed by the government but this 
is not the case for all classes of economic activity, 
which creates discrepancies between the sector- 
and the activity-based classification. For example, 
the section "O" of the activity classification, which 
covers "public administration, defence and 
compulsory social security", does not coincide 
with the general government because it does not 
include non-market publicly owned hospitals and 
schools. At the same time, sections "P" and "Q" 
covering "education" and "human health and social 
work activities" respectively include also private 
units performing these activities.  
Graph 7: General government employment as a share 
of the total labour force (%) 
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(1) Ranking based on 2012 data. 2012 data refer to 2010 in 
the case of DE, CY, LV, LT, AT, SI; 1999 data refer to 2000 in 
the cases of BG. Data from ILO LABORSTA for AT, BG, CY, DE, 
EL, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI and from OECD for all other countries. * 
It should be noted that, in the case of Greece, the broader 
public sector is much larger than general government with 
a high number of employees working in publicly owned 
enterprises.  
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD and 
ILO LABORSTA. 
                                                          
(11) The reference here is to the latest Statistical Classification 
of Economic Activities in the European Community 
abbreviated as NACE (Rev.2). 
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Graph 7 displays the share of general government 
employment to the total labour force, following the 
sector-based classification. (12) In 2012, the 
general government in the EU employed, on 
average, 16 per cent of the total labour force, down 
from 16.7 per cent in 1999. Across the whole 
period from 1999 to 2012, the share has been 
above the EU average in Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland and Malta (before the crisis), but also in 
France and in the Baltics. By contrast, it has been 
well below-average in a number of new EU 
Member States, plus Austria, Germany, Ireland 
and in the Netherlands. In the case of Greece, the 
relatively small size of general government masks 
the fact that publicly owned firms not included in 
general government data employ as much as 12.8 
per cent of the labour force. (13)  
Graph 8: General government wage consumption bill 
as a share of GDP (%) 
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(1) Ranking based on 2012 data.  
Source: Own calculations based on data from DG ECFIN 
AMECO Database. 
Graph 8 displays the share of general government 
wage spending to GDP. The average share has 
been constant in the EU over 1999-2012 at 11 per 
cent of GDP, but there are but important cross-
country differences. The EU countries where 
government wage consumption is high relatively to 
GDP are the same where the government is a large 
employer, with the two exceptions of Belgium and 
Slovenia, where general government is not a large 
employer but still the ratio of the government wage 
consumption to GDP is above the EU average. 
During the crisis period, the strongest reductions in 
                                                          
(12) Data on general government employment are taken from 
the OECD integrated with data from ILO LABORSTA 
when not available from the OECD. Labour force data are 
taken from Eurostat.  
(13) The figure for the share of the labour force employed in 
publicly owned enterprises refers to 2008. 
the government wage bill took place in Portugal 
and Hungary, followed by Ireland and Greece, 
reflecting to a large extent these countries' effort to 
contain public spending in the midst of the crisis.  
Graph 9: Share of general government compensations 
in total government spending (%) 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from DG ECFIN 
AMECO Database. 
Not only does the general government employ a 
large portion of the labour force, but 
compensations of public employees represent a 
significant share of total government expenditures 
(Graph 9). In 1999, government wages in the EU 
were equal to an average of 25 per cent of total 
spending. They were well above-average in 
Denmark, Estonia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta and 
Portugal, hinting at the presence of scale 
economies in the provision of public goods and at 
the possibility that small countries use public 
employment as an insurance against systemic 
external risks (e.g., Rodrik, 2000). 
Graph 10: Change in the share of general government 
compensations to total spending 2008-2012 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from DG ECFIN 
AMECO Database 
Over the 2008-2012 period, the EU27 average 
wage bill was downsized relatively to other 
spending items down to 23 per cent of total public 
spending. Latvia, Portugal, Romania, followed by 
Hungary, Spain, Denmark, and Estonia show the 
largest decreases (Graph 10). 
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3.2. Government compensations 
Graph 11 displays the ratio of nominal 
compensations per general government employee 
to nominal compensations in market services and 
in the total economy. (14) In most countries, over 
the period 1980-2012, the ratio exceeded one, 
pointing to a positive government-private wage 
gap. The gap has been on average high and rising 
until the outbreak of the crisis mainly in Ireland, 
Italy, Spain, and Portugal. (15)   
Simple ratios are imperfect measures of the public 
wage premium, as they do not account for the 
composition of the labour force (16). Indeed higher 
                                                          
(14) Data are calculated from OECD as the share of government 
final wage consumption expenditure to general government 
employment. Data on compensations per employee in non-
market services and total economy stem from DG ECFIN 
AMECO Database. 
(15) Data on individual compensations of general government 
employees are not available for Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. 
(16) A note on terminology: the term "gap" is used here to refer 
to the distance between the average government wage and 
public wages may be justified by differences in the 
in the individual characteristics of public versus 
private employees concerning for example gender, 
age, education, type of occupation, etc. The next 
section is devoted to an analysis of the public wage 
premium indeed controlling for a number of 
observable individual characteristics. 
4. ASSESSING THE PUBLIC WAGE PREMIUM 
There is a large volume of literature that analyses 
the public-private wage premium using micro-data 
for a single EU country. (17) Most of these studies 
conclude that there exists a marked pay differential 
between the two sectors. The wage premium in the 
public sector is generally found to be higher for 
                                                                                   
the average private wage; the term "premium" is instead 
used to refer to the distance that remains between the two, 
after having accounted for the characteristics of employees. 
(17) For a comprehensive review of the literature focusing on 
the euro area, see Giordano et al., (2011). 
Graph 11: Ratio of general government to private nominal compensation per employee (alternative definitions): 1980-
2012 
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(1)Government compensations per employee are taken from OECD, total economy and market services compensations per 
employee from DG ECFIN AMECO Database. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD and DG ECFIN AMECO Database. 
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women than it is for men, and higher at the lower- 
end of the income distribution.  
Only relatively few studies have examined the 
public-private wage premium in an international 
perspective, not least because of the difficulty in 
obtaining homogenous cross-country data. 
Brunello and Dustman (1997) look at Italy and 
Germany and find evidence of a public wage 
premium, which is higher in Italy (21 per cent) 
than in Germany (7 per cent). More recently, 
Lucifora and Meurs (2006) compare results across 
France, Great Britain and Italy and suggest that the 
public pay premium is smaller in the countries 
where pay formation is generally more regulated 
(e.g., France and Italy) and larger otherwise (e.g., 
Great Britain). Giordano et al. (2011) equally find 
a positive public-private wage premium, which is 
especially evident in Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain.  
The existing literature has emphasised public 
sector wage premia as a manifestation of rents 
accruing to unions and politicians concerned by 
electoral motives (Gelb et al., 1991; Holmlund, 
1993; Agenor, 1995; Rodrik, 2000, Matschke, 
2003).  
What was somehow neglected in most existing 
analyses is that the mere presence of a significant 
wage premium is incompatible with the 
assumption of labour mobility and market clearing 
over the medium-term: positive (negative) wage 
premia in the public sector would imply workers 
moving away from (into) private firms and into 
(away from) the government sector until wage 
differences become insignificant. Only recently, 
the persistence of public sector wage premia has 
been rationalised on the basis of imperfect labour 
matching (justifying limited labour mobility 
between the private and the public sector) and 
unilateral wage posting in the government sector 
as opposed to bargaining in the private sector (e.g., 
Quadrini and Trigari, 2008; Gomes, 2010). 
Concerning the implications of significant wage 
premia, these primarily concern labour allocation 
and microeconomic efficiency, but have also 
relevant macroeconomic repercussions, in that the 
distribution of labour and human capital between 
the government and the private sector is relevant 
also from the viewpoint of countries’ production 
specialization patterns, and of their export and 
growth potential. 
4.1. Stylised facts 
Survey-based data from the European Structure of 
Earnings Survey (SES henceforth) are used here to 
assess the size of wage premia in the EU. (18) The 
dataset provides data on hourly gross earnings and 
a description of individual characteristics including 
information on whether the individual works for 
the public or the private sector. (19) Data for 
earnings by workers’ characteristics are available 
for all EU27 countries, except Sweden. (20) 
As the survey data used in the analysis do not 
allow for the identification of general government 
employees, the definition of public sector wages 
differ from the one employed in the rest of this 
paper. Public employees are classified in this case 
as those employed in entities owned by the 
government (i.e., property share higher than 50 per 
cent), yet the agricultural sector and firms with less 
than 10 employees are excluded. 
It is also important to note that SES data were not 
available after 2010 at the time the analysis was 
carried out. This limits the breadth of the analysis, 
as important measures aimed at freezing or 
reducing the public wage bill were introduced in 
2011, 2012 in a number of EU countries. 
Graph 12 displays data on the public-private wage 
gap, namely the percentage difference in hourly 
gross earnings between the public and the private 
sector, in this case without taking into account 
differences in individual characteristics. ()On 
average, public wages tend to be higher than 
private wages across the EU except for Denmark, 
Finland, Slovakia and Estonia (just in 2006) and 
Hungary (just in 2010). The difference across the 
two sectors is sizeable in Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, 
and slightly smaller in Belgium, Spain, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.  
In 2010, there is evidence of a narrowing of the 
gap compared with 2006 in Bulgaria, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and, to a smaller 
                                                          
(18) The data used do not include the agricultural sector and 
firms with less than ten employees. 
(19) For a full list of individual characteristics, see Box 1. 
(20) Sweden is excluded from the sample because information 
distinguishing by type of labour contract is not available. 
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extent, in Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, and 
Slovenia. Of course, such a change in the wage 
gap could be linked to changing composition of 
public employment rather than a variation of 
earnings received by the different categories of 
public employees. 
Graph 13 displays the average wage difference 
between public and private employees accounting 
for broad categories of individual characteristics: 
gender, educational attainment, age, and type of 
contract. (21) 
Generally, the public wage differential is higher 
for women, except for Bulgaria, Greece, and 
Hungary. Moreover, the average difference tends 
to be higher for workers with primary and 
secondary education. The exception is represented 
by Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy and 
Spain, where highly skilled workers of the public 
sector appear to enjoy higher wages than the 
highly skilled working in the private sector. (22) 
Older workers in the public sector receive on 
average a higher wage than those working in the 
private sector;  and the differential is smaller 
greater for this age group than for younger 
workers. Clear exceptions in this case are Malta, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. Finally, higher 
public wages are observed for the three types of 
                                                          
(21) The figures provide a soft descriptive version of the public 
wage premium, as they account for broad features taken 
one a time.  
(22) It should be noted however that for Belgium, Greece, Italy 
and Spain, there are no data available for the NACE sector 
"public administration, defence and compulsory social 
security", which limits cross-country comparability and 
could potentially bias the figures. 
contracts considered (i.e., permanent, fixed-term 
contracts and apprentices). In 2006, the differential 
was especially high for fixed-term contracts but 
was significantly narrowed in 2010. 
4.2. Estimating the public wage premium  
The wage premium is analysed by regressing the 
wage of the reference individual on dummies for 
the sector and other individual characteristics. Box 
1 describes in detail the estimation technique and 
the results for the pooled regression on the basis of 
data relating to 2010. The unavailability of more 
up-to-date survey data does not allow 
incorporating the numerous changes to public 
wage levels that have been introduced in a number 
of EU countries over 2011-2013. It is found that, 
on average, the public wage premium in the EU is 
at 3.6 per cent. All individual characteristics yield 
the expected signs, with lower wages found for 
females, younger workers, low-skilled, apprentices 
and fixed-term contracts, the sector of wholesale, 
retail and food services, and occupations below the 
technician level.  
Table 3 provides data on the 2010 wage premium 
in the public sector, by country and by gender. 
Hourly earnings are higher than in the private 
sector and above the EU average in Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain. 
The wage premium is negative in Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia. In the remaining 
EU countries, there is no substantial difference 
between public and private wage levels.  
Graph 12: Average public-private hourly wage gap (% of hourly earnings in the private sector), evidence from individual 
survey-data. 
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Source:  Own estimation based on SES. 
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Graph 13: Average wage differences between the public and private sector (%of hourly private earnings), evidence from 
individual survey-data. 
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Source: Own estimation based on data from SES. 
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Most interestingly, female public workers enjoy 
higher earnings only in Germany, Spain, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal but, 
on the whole, there is no clear-cut and broad-based 
evidence of a wage premium in favour of women 
working in the government sector, a result that is 
in contrast with most of the existing literature.(23) 
 
Table 3: Public wage premium in 2010: regression 
results by country and by gender 
Whole sample Male Female
BG -0.093* 0.016 -0.261***
CY 0.209*** 0.199*** 0.186***
CZ -0.048* -0.027 -0.076***
DE 0.1*** 0.083** 0.129***
DK -0.14*** -0.155*** -0.123***
EE -0.151*** -0.08** -0.23***
ES 0.151*** 0.131*** 0.168***
FI -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.066***
FR -0.037** -0.01 -0.054***
GR 0.083*** 0.103** 0.066*
HU -0.163*** -0.091** -0.231***
IE 0.212*** 0.196*** 0.218***
LT 0.046 0.118** -0.028
LV -0.075*** -0.008 -0.139***
NL -0.005 -0.059*** 0.039**
PL 0.065** 0.085** 0.019
RO -0.046 0.075 -0.237***
SI 0.056*** 0.08*** 0.022
SK -0.101*** -0.047 -0.158***
UK -0.013 -0.001 -0.017
AT 0.061*** 0.067** 0.054***
BE 0.117*** 0.104*** 0.128***
IT 0.105*** 0.059** 0.145***
LU 0.204*** 0.226*** 0.161***
MT -0.011 0.002 -0.025
PT 0.119*** 0.109*** 0.12***
EU 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.029  
(1) Estimation method: OLS. Sample: all EU countries but 
Sweden. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. For AT, BE, IT, LU, MT, PT there is 
no information on the aggregate "public administration, 
defence and compulsory social security". 
Source: Own estimation based on data from SES. 
 
Table 4 juxtaposes the size of the wage premium 
in 2006 and 2010. The definition of the public 
sector differs from one year to the other for a 
number of countries (i.e., France, Germany, 
                                                          
(23) Meurs and Ponthieux (2005) analysed the gender pay gap 
across 10 EU countries and conclude that the public sector 
is in general more favourable to women than to men. 
Greece and Spain), which partially impairs 
comparability between the two years. (24)  
 
Table 4: Public wage premium: regression results by 
country and by year 
2006 2010
BG 0.026 -0.093*
CY 0.183*** 0.209***
CZ -0.07*** -0.048*
DE -0.016 0.013
DK -0.132*** -0.14***
EE -0.229*** -0.151***
ES 0.18*** 0.162***
FI -0.065*** -0.069***
FR -0.075** -0.023
GR 0.067*** 0.089***
HU -0.044* -0.163***
IE 0.205*** 0.212***
LT 0.022 0.046
LV -0.106*** -0.075***
NL -0.126*** -0.005
PL 0.09*** 0.065**
RO 0.174*** -0.046
SI 0.046*** 0.056***
SK -0.09*** -0.101***
UK 0.036** -0.013
AT 0.046** 0.061***
BE 0.124*** 0.117***
IT 0.133*** 0.105***
LU 0.23*** 0.204***
MT 0.049*** -0.011
PT 0.197*** 0.119***  
(1) Estimation method: OLS. Sample: all EU countries but 
Sweden. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. For AT, BE, IT, LU, MT, PT there is no 
information on the 2010 aggregate "public administration, 
defence and compulsory social security". 
Source: Own estimation based on data from SES. 
 
Results indicate that the premium has been 
narrowing over time in Belgium, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Spain. 
Conversely, it has increased in Austria, Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, and Slovenia. It should be stressed 
that these changes control for changes in the 
composition of the labour force in the two sectors. 
Finally, table 5 provides evidence on the size of 
the public premium based on educational 
attainment. Despite the well-known evidence that 
public wage premia are higher for low-wage 
earners, which justifies frequently positive wage 
premia for low education workers, there are 
countries where also workers with high education 
                                                          
(24) However, regressions run on the restricted sample with the 
same definition of public sector do not indicate that the 
omission of the NACE sector "public administration, 
defence and compulsory social security" has a large impact 
on results. 
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level receive a premium from working in the 
public sector (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain). (25) This 
evidence would suggest that indeed in a number of 
countries the public sector is attracting the highly 
skilled to the disadvantage of the private sector. 
 
Table 5: Public wage premium in 2010: regression 
results by country and by educational 
attainment 
Low education Medium education High education 
BG 0.126*** 0.124*** -0.397***
CY 0.298*** 0.166*** 0.207***
CZ 0.093*** 0.037 -0.301***
DE 0.245*** 0.122*** -0.168***
DK -0.073*** -0.089*** -0.207***
EE -0.072* -0.086** -0.242***
ES 0.208*** 0.166*** 0.091***
FI -0.11*** -0.049*** -0.082***
FR 0.064*** -0.017 -0.101***
GR 0.287*** 0.149*** -0.019
HU -0.035 -0.082** -0.407***
IE 0.243*** 0.175*** 0.218***
LT 0.018 0.1** -0.015
LV 0.008 0.004 -0.203***
NL 0.053** 0.034** -0.097***
PL 0.162*** 0.131*** -0.087**
RO 0.113** 0.17*** -0.422***
SI 0.113*** 0.08*** -0.034*
SK 0.06*** -0.025 -0.284***
UK 0.035 -0.044 -0.002
AT 0.038 0.066** 0.046**
BE 0.08** 0.061*** 0.134***
IT 0.159*** 0.045* 0.1***
LU 0.193*** 0.189*** 0.216***
MT 0.023 -0.068 -0.024
PT 0.186*** 0.082** 0.045**
EU 0.117*** 0.065*** -0.066***  
(1) Estimation method: OLS. Sample: all EU countries but 
Sweden. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. For AT, BE, IT, LU, MT, PT there is no 
information on the aggregate "public administration, 
defence and compulsory social security". 
Source: Own estimation based on data from SES. 
 
The estimated wage premium differs, as expected, 
from the public-private wage gap computed 
without controlling for individual characteristics, 
but maintains a strong correlation across countries. 
Graph 14 compares data on the estimated public 
premium with the general government-private 
wage gap (i.e., the simple percentage difference 
between nominal compensations per employee in 
government and in the market service sector) as 
                                                          
(25) It should be noted however that figures are not fully 
comparable across countries because in the case of many of 
them data on "public administration, defence and 
compulsory social security" is not available (e.g., Austria, 
Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal).  
calculated from national accounts data. It shows 
that the estimated public wage premium is 
considerably smaller than the simple wage gap, 
which confirms that the excess of public over 
private wages is linked, at least to a certain extent, 
to composition effects. 
Graph 14: Correlation between the estimated public 
wage premium and the wage gap between 
government and private wages 
R² = 0.5382
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Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD and 
data from SES. 
Whilst there is some empirical research on the 
existence and size of public wage premia in the 
individual countries, there is comparatively less on 
their possible determinants. Cross-country 
correlations are computed between the estimated 
wage premia and a number of country 
characteristics to shed light on possible factors that 
may bear an impact on the premium. The variables 
that are taken into consideration are: i) rights of 
bargaining, rights of association and rights of 
strike in the public sector as defined in Visser 
(2013); ii) public sector union density; iii) private 
sector employment protection legislation; and iv) 
the size of general government as an employer.  
High scores on rights of bargaining, association 
and strike in the public sector as well as in union 
density in the public sector are taken to indicate 
high bargaining power for government employees 
and are expected to be positively related to premia 
in that sector.  
The indicator capturing employment protection 
legislation taken from the OECD and measuring 
the strictness of regulation on dismissals for open-
ended contracts is likely to be positively related to 
the public wage premium for a different reason: 
the higher, the degree of job security provided in 
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the private sector, the higher the pay required to 
attract workers in the public sector.  
Finally, the size of government as an employer, 
measured as the ratio of general government 
employment to the labour force in year 2008, has 
an a-priori ambiguous relation with the wage 
premium. On the one hand, a large public sector is 
more likely to act as a wage leader, being therefore 
able to set wages that differ from those prevailing 
in the private sector. On the other hand, the larger 
the government sector, the higher its 
monopsonistic power and the bargaining power it 
has in wage negotiations, and hence the lower the 
expected wage premium. 
 
Table 6: Cross-country rank correlation between 
public wage premium and selected country 
institutions and characteristics 
 
*: p<0.1 or lower (correlations are calculated using pairwise 
deletion of observations with missing values). Results based 
on 26 observation points. Method: Spearman's rank 
correlation. Variables: Rights of bargaining, rights of 
association and rights of strike range from 0 (no right) to 3 
(full rights", with intermediate values indicating rights with 
restrictions (Visser, 2013); public sector union density=net 
union membership as  a share of wage and salary earners in 
the public sector (Visser, 2013); EPL= strictness of regulation 
on individual and collective dismissals for open-ended 
contracts (OECD, 2013); public employment to labour force 
= share of general government employees to total labour 
force in 2008 (OECD and Eurostat).  
Source: Visser (2013) and OECD (2013). 
 
Rank correlation results are shown in Table 6. (26) 
The reference year is 2010 for both the data on the 
premium and the institutional variables, where 
available. (27) The two indicators summarising 
right of bargaining and of association in the 
government sector are positively related with the 
wage premium as expected, but the relation is non- 
significant, while for the right-of-strike variable 
the relation has an unexpected negative sign. 
Union density in the public sector also appears to 
be negatively but insignificantly linked to the wage 
premium, a result that however confirms existing 
                                                          
(26) Given the limited number of observations, the 
interpretation of the results is merely tentative. 
(27) It should be noted however that institutional variables are 
relatively time-invariant so that taking averages over a 
longer period of time including years before 2010 would 
not affect the ranking of countries.  
findings. (28) In line with expectations, 
employment protection legislation delivers a 
statistically significant positive 
correlation.  Finally, the public premium is 
negatively related to the importance of general 
government as an employer, which hints at the 
possible prevalence of monopsony and of 
bargaining power effects. 
It is likely that the public premium is also related 
to the type of wage-setting in the government 
sector. It is expected that the incidence of positive 
public premia is lower when government wages 
are set through bargaining than when they are the 
result of legislative decisions, as defined in Table 
1.2. This is because wages are more likely to be 
aligned to those set in the private sector when 
determined on the basis of a bargaining process 
where a multiplicity of actors participate with 
wage offers and demands linked to outside options 
and benchmarks defined in the private sector. The 
evidence seems to partly support this hypothesis. 
Among non-former-transition EU countries, with 
relatively more established traditions of 
autonomous industrial relations, the share of 
countries with a positive wage premium is 55% for 
those countries with a prevailing bargaining 
model, but of 70% for those countries with a 
prevailing “decision” wage setting model. 
 
                                                          
(28) Giordano et al (2011) analyse wage premia on a sample of 
euro area countries over 2004-2007 and do not find that 
they relate to unions' bargaining power. 
Rights of barganing 0.133
Rights of association 0.200
Rights of strike -0.074
Public sector union density -0.139
Employment protection legislation 0.373*
Public employment to labour force -0.472*
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Box 1: Testing for the public wage premium based on survey-based data
The European Structure of Earnings Survey (SES henceforth) provides survey-based data on hourly earnings 
in Euros (1), which are here treated so as to obtain average earnings for individuals that share a set of common 
characteristics. Individual characteristics include: ownership of the firm or institution, gender, age group, 
educational attainment, job position, NACE sector group, and type of contract. The survey provides data for 
the years 2006 and 2010, and contains sample weights that make it comparable to the overall population. As 
concerns the distinction between the public and the private sector, this micro-dataset provides direct 
information on whether the surveyed employees work for the public or the private sector, circumventing 
problems associated with cross-country differences in the definition of the public sector. The SES provides 
information for EU27. (3) 
Categories are constructed for each non-binary dimension. For age, three groups are isolated: young workers 
(between 15 and 29 years of age), middle-age workers (between 30 and 49) and older workers (over 50 
years). Levels of educational attainment are equally divided into three categories: lower education comprising 
workers with primary and secondary education (ISCED codes 0, 1, and 2), middle education for persons with 
upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED codes 3 and 4), and high education 
comprising individuals with first and second stage tertiary education (ISCED codes 5 and 6). The other 
classification is about job positions. These are based on the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO) and divided into nine major groups. NACE codes are grouped into three big categories: 
the first includes mining, manufacturing, industry and construction; the second wholesale and retail trade, 
accommodation and food services activities; the third refers to the rest of services. Three types of contract are 
identified, namely permanent, fixed-term and apprentice. The resulting dataset provides for average hourly 
wages for combination of characteristics (e.g. gender, age group, etc.) reorganizing 107.781.401 individuals 
surveyed into 22.748 observations, corresponding to each of the combinations of characteristics. (4) 
The dependent variable consists of the average hourly earnings in natural log. The explanatory variables are 
dummies that refer to the different characteristics of individuals and that are expected to determine earning 
levels. Dummy variables capture whether the individual is working for the government or the private sector, 
gender, age group, educational attainment, sector of activity according to NACE codes, type of contract and 
type of job according to ISCO codes (except "Armed forces" that have been excluded from the analysis). The 
impact of individual characteristics is tested against a reference category, which is here represented by a male 
employee, working in the private sector, between 30 and 49 years of age, with secondary education, and on a 
permanent contract as a technician. The baseline estimation is as follows: 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 · 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋′ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ,     (1) 
where i denotes each of the different combination of characteristics, and the variable "sector" takes the value 
1 if the employee works in the public sector and zero otherwise. As the dependent variable enters in logs, the 
coefficient β can be interpreted as the percentage wage premium in the public sector. This equation is 
estimated by pooled OLS techniques, with country fixed effects (taking Slovenia as the reference country) 
and using sample employment weights provided by the SES to make the sample comparable with the total 
population. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
                                                          
(1) Hourly earnings refer to contracted gross hourly earnings and do not include 13th/14th month payment, bonuses and 
other annual payments in kind, which are otherwise included in annual earnings. This is a limit of the dataset because 
it may result in public wage premia being either over- or under-estimated. 
(3) Sweden is but excluded from the present analysis, as it did not provide information on the type of contract, which 
limits comparability with other countries. 
(4) Observations with less than ten individuals were discarded.  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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5. LINKAGES AND INTERACTION BETWEEN 
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE WAGES 
5.1. Channels of interactions 
The relationship between the two sectoral wages 
takes multiple shapes and may be driven by market 
forces and/or by institutional features of the wage 
setting process in each country. In a nutshell, 
changes in private wages can affect government 
wage growth via the following transmission 
channels: 
• Wage bargaining in the private sector has a 
demonstration effect on public wage setters. 
Perez and Sanchez (2011) find evidence of 
signalling by the private sector already in the 
negotiation phase in France and Germany 
before the EMU period. Signalling may be 
motivated by, for example, envy effects (see, 
e.g., Maffezzoli, 2001; Ardagna 2007).  
• Wage bargaining practices may explicitly or 
implicitly grant wage leadership to the private 
sector. Under the so-called Scandinavian wage 
determination model, the private (exposed) 
sector typically takes the lead and dictates 
bargaining outcomes to other sectors, including 
Box (continued) 
 
Lower salaries are found for females, young workers, the low-skilled workers, apprentices, and fixed-term 
contracts, wholesale, retail and food services, workers at an ISCO job category below technician. By contrast, 
older workers, high educational levels and workers employed in the industry sector enjoy higher 
remunerations. 
Table 1. Wage levels and individual characteristics: regression results, panel, 2010 
Dependent variable: average hourly earnings (log) Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Public 0.036 0.012 3.0 
Gender -0.174 0.009 -19.6 
Young -0.207 0.009 -21.8 
Old 0.045 0.010 4.5 
Low education -0.101 0.009 -10.9 
High education 0.168 0.013 12.6 
Apprentice -0.898 0.032 -27.6 
Fixed-term contract -0.141 0.009 -16.5 
Industry 0.049 0.010 5.0 
Service 1 -0.092 0.013 -7.3 
Manager 0.442 0.019 22.8 
Professional 0.014 13.520 0.0 
Clerical -0.204 0.010 -20.0 
Sales -0.287 0.016 -17.9 
Agriculture -0.448 0.014 -32.8 
Craft -0.256 0.013 -19.1 
Plant -0.288 0.015 -19.2 
Elementary -0.402 0.020 -20.4 
    
Country fixed effects    BG -1.531 0.020 -75.6 
CY 0.258 0.021 12.1 
CZ -0.536 0.013 -40.3 
DE 0.709 0.015 48.7 
DK 1.046 0.032 33.1 
EE -0.680 0.019 -35.0 
ES 0.305 0.012 24.6 
FI 0.668 0.015 45.6 
FR 0.545 0.013 43.1 
GR 0.166 0.016 10.3 
HU -0.759 0.018 -41.7 
IE 0.812 0.017 48.6 
LT -1.087 0.017 -65.4 
LV -0.931 0.016 -56.7 
NL 0.658 0.013 49.0 
PL -0.650 0.021 -31.7 
RO -1.320 0.021 -63.6 
SK -0.655 0.015 -44.0 
UK 0.497 0.015 32.3 
Constant 2.338 0.017 138.6 
No. Obs. 22784   R² 0.9416   
Method: OLS (employment-weighted) with country-fixed effects (Slovenia used as reference country) and robust standard 
errors. Sample: 22784 observations (all EU countries except Sweden); as there is no information on the aggregate "public 
administration, defence and compulsory social security" in the case of AT, BE, IT, LU, MT, PT, these countries are 
excluded from the pooled regression. Source: Own estimations based on SES. 
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the public sector (see, for a review, Lindquist 
and Vilhemsson, 2006 and Friberg, 2007, but 
also Traxler and Brandl, 2012; Ramskloger, 
2012, 2013). Wage bargaining coordination via 
pattern-setting by the exposed sector is, for 
example, typical of countries such as Germany 
and Austria (see, for example, Soskice, 1990).  
• There may also be established practices and 
institutional mechanisms that make public 
wages responsive to private wage settlements, 
for example when there is a formal rule for 
which the growth rate of private wages is 
automatically applied to public sector wages 
(see, for evidence on the Netherlands, Hartog 
and Oosterbeek, 1993). 
The interaction can of course go both ways. 
Changes in government wages may affect private 
wage growth through a number of channels: 
• Wage adjustment in the public sector induces 
cross-sector labour shifts and a change in the 
labour supply available to the private sector. As 
the supply of labour changes, so does the 
equilibrium wage of the competitive private 
sector. 
• Changes in public wages affect the outside 
option of unionised private sector bargainers, 
thereby putting pressures on the bargaining 
process (Afonso and Gomes, 2008), even when 
public and private employment remain separate 
and there is no mobility across sectors. 
• Adjustment to public wages may be fully 
compensated in government budgets by 
changes in labour taxation that alter labour 
costs in the private sector (Holmlund, 1993; 
Afonso and Gomes, 2008). (29) 
It is important to stress that co-movements 
between government and private wages may arise 
also in absence of direct links, driven by common 
factors. For example, public wages may be pro-
cyclical and move similarly to private wages along 
                                                          
(29) However, the spill-over is likely to be mediated by the 
structure of wage-setting systems. Alesina and Perotti 
(1997) find that increases in labour taxation do not 
necessarily lead to higher wage demands by unions in 
highly centralised bargaining systems, as in such a case 
wage setters internalise the consequences from higher 
labour costs on employment. 
the cycle. (30) Moreover, co-movements in 
aggregate wage series could be linked to common 
developments for what concerns the composition 
of the labour force. For the above reasons, in 
analysing the interaction between government and 
private wages, it is important to disentangle direct 
links from spurious co-movements, related to the 
action of third variables that have an effect on both 
wages. 
In the analysis of the interplay between 
government and private wages it is also important 
to distinguish relations that hold between growth 
rates and levels. While wage growth in one sector 
is expected to be affected only temporarily by 
wage growth in the other sector, wage levels 
would be affected permanently. In the following, 
different techniques are used to analyse relations 
both in growth and in level terms. 
5.2. Dynamic interaction between general 
government and market sector nominal 
compensations' growth 
Co-movement between government and private 
wages does not necessarily imply causality. 
Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) models 
represent a useful framework to estimate the joint 
dynamic behaviour of wage variables, as they 
allow analysing whether there is causality and in 
what direction it runs. 
There is a wide and growing literature that has 
looked at the dynamic interaction between public 
and private wages using the VAR approach (see, 
e.g., Demekas and Kontolemis, 2000; Lindquist 
and Vilhelmsson, 2006; Friberg 2007; Lamo, Perez 
and Schuknecht, 2012; Perez and Sanchez, 2011). 
Some papers adopt a cointegrated VAR framework 
(VECM), which builds on the existence of a long-
run relation between wage levels in the different 
sectors. Results differ not only depending on the 
country analysed and the specific sample, but also 
depending on the methodology adopted, notably 
the specification of the VAR.  
An issue which has been analysed in depth in these 
studies is the presence of government versus 
private sector leadership in wage determination. 
                                                          
(30) For instance, Lane (2003) and Lamo et al (2007) find that 
public wages are pro-cyclical because of discretionary 
fiscal expansion in good times. 
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(31) Determining whether government or private 
sector leadership prevails has relevance both for 
fiscal policy and for labour market outcomes. 
While government leadership may imply a 
decoupling of private sector wages from 
productivity with implications for competitiveness, 
private sector leadership may imply limited control 
of the government on the wages it pays, which are 
determined in the long-term by drivers originating 
in the private sector. 
A few studies look simultaneously at groups of 
countries adopting a homogenous methodology. 
Lamo, Perez and Schuknecht (2012) estimate a 
VECM model on 18 OECD countries over the 
1970-2006 period. The authors find long-run wage 
leadership by the private sector in the US, Canada, 
the UK, Sweden, Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal. The public sector exercises long-run 
leadership in Ireland, Norway, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. In 
the short-run, private wages take the lead in 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium. Short-run public sector 
leadership is manifest only in Spain and the UK. 
Along similar lines, Perez and Sanchez (2011) use 
a standard VAR framework to identify intra-annual 
interactions between private and public wages. (32) 
The authors find strong evidence of signalling 
effects across the two sectors that are especially 
strong in France and Germany in the pre-EMU 
period. 
The analysis described in Box 2 focuses on the 
short-run relations between wage growth in the 
government and in the private sector by applying 
the same SVAR approach to all EU countries for 
                                                          
(31) Wage leadership is generally identified in the short run by 
looking at Granger causation, and in the long-term by 
looking at the adjustment to the long-term relation (the 
adjustment being fully achieved by the wage changes in the 
sector without leadership as determined by Granger 
causation). The majority of these studies focus on single 
countries. For the Swedish case, evidence of wage 
leadership by the private sector is reported in Lindquist and 
Vilhelmsson (2006), while Freiberg (2007) finds causation 
from the private to the government sector but no wage 
leadership over the longer term. 
(32) The theoretical motivation derives from models such as 
Maffezzoli (2001) and Ardagna (2007), where it is 
suggested that spillovers between government and private 
sector wages occur as the outcome of the behaviour of 
sectoral unions with objectives defined not only in terms of 
absolute but also of relative wages. 
which sufficiently long annual time series are 
available. Compared with existing analyses, the 
sample includes post-crisis years, as it ranges from 
1980 to 2012. The SVAR model permits to capture 
the interactions among the main variables linked to 
wage growth. Government and private nominal 
wage growth are assumed to be related not only 
among themselves but also with inflation and the 
output gap, chosen as measure of cyclical 
conditions. All shocks are assumed to have only 
transitory effects, which permits to model a richer 
set of interactions among macroeconomic 
variables. 
The identifying restrictions imposed on the VAR 
allow interpreting the shocks in the model and 
computing the response of wages to each type of 
shock. Following standard assumptions in the 
literature on fiscal policy (see, e.g., Fatas and 
Mihov, 2001; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), it is 
assumed that government wages are 
predetermined, namely that they are not directly 
nor simultaneously affected by other 
macroeconomic variables, while reacting with 
lags.  
Graph 15: Response of private nominal compensations 
growth to a 1% shock in government sector 
compensations' growth 
 
(1)Based on exercise described in Box 1.2. The results are 
but not statistically significant for DK (response at peak 
only), France (response at peak only) and DE (one-year 
lagged response only). 
Source: Own calculations. 
Graph 15 reproduces the response of private 
compensations to a 1 per cent shock in general 
government compensations. The graph 
distinguishes between the response at peak and the 
response 1 year from the occurrence of the shock. 
In many cases, the peak effect and the effect after 
1 year tend to coincide, indicating that the effects 
from the shock decay after the first year. Only in 
France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the effect at 
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peak is stronger than short-term effects. The 
greatest short-term response is estimated for Italy, 
followed by Finland and Belgium. The strongest 
at-peak reaction are found in Italy, Portugal, Spain 
and France, with private wages reacting by 1.7, 
1.6, 1.5 and 1.4 per cent respectively in the face of 
a 1 per cent shock in general government 
compensations.  
It should be noted however that the analysis is 
based on a number of identifying restrictions and 
that the SVAR framework does not allow 
accounting for non-time-variant variables such as 
actual institutional features of wage-setting and 
wage leadership practices in each country. By way 
of example, wage growth in Germany is highly 
coordinated thanks to the fact that the export sector 
is a pattern setter for all other sectors. There is thus 
no such thing as wage leadership by the public 
sector. Moreover, the culture of fiscal discipline 
and the existence of stringent fiscal rules is a 
further guarantee that public employees do not 
free-ride by asking for excessive wage increases 
(Soskice, 2007). The results from the SVAR are 
not necessarily in contradiction with this 
institutional set-up. First, the one-year lagged 
impulse response for Germany is insignificant. 
Second, the at-peak response is relatively weak 
compared with other countries and possibly also 
driven by second round effects via inflation; 
moreover, the impulse response of manufacturing 
wages does not necessarily imply changes in cost 
competitiveness (i.e., a change in the real effective 
exchange rate).  
Existing analyses are relatively limited. Lamo, 
Perez and Schuknecht (2012) and Lamo, Perez and 
Sanchez-Fuentes (2013) find that public wages 
exert a stronger impact on private wages when the 
government is involved in the bargaining process, 
for high levels of bargaining centralization and 
coordination and for high levels of union 
membership, while it is weaker in cases of high 
openness to trade and in the presence of wage 
indexation.  
Graph 16: Correlation between the peak response of 
private to government wages and trade 
openness 
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Source: Own calculations based on DG ECFIN AMECO 
Database and results from exercise described in Box 1.2 
Graph 16 displays a cross-country scatterplot of 
the peak response of private sector wages to 
government wage shocks with the average degree 
of openness over the period 1980-2012. (33) The 
scatterplot broadly confirms the expectation that 
the response of private wages to a rise in the 
government wage is weaker in countries that are 
highly open to international trade.  
The most persuasive explanation for such evidence 
is that in highly open economies not only prices 
but also labour costs in the private sector are less 
likely to deviate considerably from those 
prevailing on international markets. 
                                                          
(33) Openness is measured as the sum of exports and imports as 
a share of GDP. 
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Box 2: Private and government wage interactions over the business cycle
This box analyses the short-run interdependencies between private and government wages in a Structural 
Vector Autoregression (SVAR) framework.  
In VAR models, each variable is assumed to be determined by its own past values and the past values of all 
other variables in the system, so that shocks in each variable produce effects on all other variables over time. 
For the purpose of this analysis the model is made of 4 variables: the growth rate of nominal compensation 
per employees of the government and the private sector, the growth of prices, and the output gap. All these 
variables are likely to be stationary over sufficiently long time periods, and are treated as such in the present 
analysis, which allows estimating the VAR with standard techniques. It also means that the response to 
shocks is expected to fade away over time.  
The economic interpretation of the impulse response of each variable to shocks requires imposing restrictions 
on the system: in absence of such restrictions it would be impossible to identify the shocks, namely to pin 
down whether a particular shock originates, from government wages, private wages, price inflation, or the 
output gap. Following standard assumptions in the literature on fiscal policy shocks (e.g., Fatas and Mihov, 
2001; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), government sector wages are treated as predetermined with respect to 
macroeconomic shocks, meaning that spending on government wages is undertaken for reasons different 
from a reaction to macroeconomic conditions (the output gap, wage or price inflation), although variations in 
these variables can reverberate on government wages with lags. The output gap, private wages, and prices are 
assumed to potentially respond instead to the other variables also without lags. This corresponds for instance 
to the case of wage setters in the private sector updating their decisions as soon as government wages are 
changed or inflation picks up.  
Formally the identification strategy described above corresponds to imposing structure on the residuals of the 
reduced form of the VAR by means of a Choleski factorization, which introduces a causal ordering in the 
contemporaneous relationship between the variables. In this case, reduced form of the VAR can be 
represented as follows,  
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Where 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠   are shocks to the VAR equations, 𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠  are the uncorrelated structural shocks to each of the variables, 
pub denotes government wages, priv  private wages, cpi  the consumer price index, and  ogap the output gap.. 
This representation imposes the following relationship between the variables:  
• the consumer price index responds contemporaneously to a price level shock, to public and private 
wages shock and to an aggregate demand shock; 
• private wages responds contemporaneously to a public wages shock and to an aggregate demand 
shock; 
• the output gap responds contemporaneously to a public wages shock;  
• government wages are supposed to respond to other variables only with lags. 
The SVAR is estimated for 12 EU countries using annual data. The countries covered are those for which 
sufficiently long time series are available: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK),  
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Box (continued) 
 
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), the United Kingdom (UK), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal 
(PT), and Sweden (SE). The sample period is 1980-2012. 1 
 
Graph 1: Impulse response to a 1% increase in government sector wages  
(mean and median across countries) 
 
Graph 2: Impulse response to a 1% increase in private sector wages  
(mean and median across countries) 
 
The SVAR estimated for each country is used to simulate the dynamic response of each endogenous variable 
to a one-time shock. Graph 1 shows the outcome that corresponds with the mean and the median impulse 
responses, while Table 1 reports the country specific responses after 1 year and the maximum response. The 
main findings are as follows:  
• The response of private wages to a government wage shock is large and persistent. A 1% increase in 
government wages raises private wages by almost 1% on average. The response of private wages to a 
government wage shock is strong in Italy, Portugal and Spain, while it is relatively weak in Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands. The increase of private wages follwing a governemnt wage shock is 
persistent in France, Belgium, and Italy and fade out rather quickly in Austria, Germany, Finalnd, UK, 
and Sweden.  
• The average response of government wages to a 1% positive shock is private wages is much lower 
(about 0.45%). With the exception of Austria, Belgium, Sweden, and the UK, government wages do not 
respond stastistically significantly to a private wage shock.  
• Consistently with the literature on fiscal SVAR (e.g., Fatas and Mihov, 2001; Blanchard and Perotti, 
2002), a considerable persistence is found in the response of government wages shock to its own shocks. 
The dynamic response of government wages to a government wage shock varyies considerably across 
                                                          
1  General government compensations per employee are constructed from OECD as the ratio of government final wage 
consumption expenditure to general government employment, with the exception of data for DE where the 
compensation per employee is calculated as the ratio of compensations of employees to total number of wage and 
salary earners for the section "other services" in the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community (NACE Rev.2). All other variables are taken from the DG ECFIN AMECO Database. Private 
compensations per employee are constructed as the ratio of compensations of employees to total number of wage and 
salary earners for the section "business economy" in the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the 
European Community (NACE Rev.2). The price level is measured by the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI) 
and the series has been extended backward by extrapolation using the growth rate of the national Consumer Price 
Index. 
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Box (continued) 
 
• countries. After one year, the response is the largest in the Portugal,  Spain and Italy and the lowest in 
Germany and Austria.  
• A government wage shock is inflationary and with an effect on CPI more persistent than that of a private 
wage shock. The maximum effect in the price level of about 0.6%-0.7% pp is achieved about 4-5 years 
after a public wage shock, and is of an order of magnitude similar to what found in the literature (e.g., 
Fatas and Mihov, 2001).  
 
Table 1: Impulse responses to public and private wage shock 
•  
• Note: Impulses response function based on SVAR estimated for each country and Choleski identification indicates 
that the impulse response function (IRF) does not die out.  
Lags BE DE DK ES FI
1 1.8 * 0.8 * 1.8 * 2.9 * 1.6 *
Max 1.8 * 0.8 * 1.8 * 2.9 * 1.6 *
Lag where IRF 
is non 
significant 8 3 5 4 5
Lags BE DE DK ES FI
1 0.5 * -0.1 0.3 * 0.4 * 0.3
Max 0.7 * -0.1 0.6 * 1.1 * 0.5 *
Lag where IRF 
is non 
significant 16 1 7 5 5
Lags BE DE DK ES FI
1 1.0 * 0.3 0.7 * 0.7 * 1.0 *
Max 1.0 * 0.5 * 0.8 1.5 * 1.1 *
Lag where IRF 
is non 
significant 13 3 6 5 3
Lags BE DE DK ES FI
1 0.7 * 0.4 * 0.6 * 0.8 * 0.9 *
Max 0.7 * 0.5 0.6 * 0.8 * 1.4 *
Lag where IRF 
is non 
significant 7 2 3 3 5
Lags BE DE DK ES FI
1 0.4 * 0.5 * -0.1 0.4 0.5 *
Max 0.4 * 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.7
Lag where IRF 
is non 
significant
9 : 2 1 1 4 6
Response of public wages to 1% shock to private sector wages
Lags BE DE DK ES FI
1 0 0 0 0 0
Max 0.8 * 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.4
Lag where IRF 
is non 
significant
10 1 1 1 1
1
1
0 1.5 *
Response of public sector wages to a 1% shock to public sector wages
Response of consumer prices to 1% shock to public sector wages
Response of private wages to 1% shock to public sector wages
Response of private wages to 1% shock to private sector wages
1 3 1
16
0.8 * 0 1.0 0 0.3
10 1 6 1
1
0 00 0
:
PT SE
0 0 0
NLAT FR UK IT
0 0.60.6 * 0.2
0 0.2
0.9 * 0.4 * 0.4
0.20.2 0.4 * 0.2 0.6 *
PT SEIT NLAT FR UK
Response of consumer prices to 1% shock to private sector wages
4 143 4
1.6 * 1.6 *
10 5 7
0.9 *1.0 0.6 1.1 * 0.7 *
1.6 * 1.2 *0.7 * 0.9 *
PT SE
0.7 * 0.6 * 1.1 *
NLAT FR UK IT
5 243 19 3 8
1.6 * 0.8 *1.7 * 0.7 *
0.8 * 0.8 *
0.7 * 1.4 0.8 *
0.7 *0.7 * 0.5 * 0.8 * 1.4 *
PT SEIT NLAT FR UK
2 210 6
-0.1 0.6 *
1 20 8
0.6 *0.2 0.9 * 1.0 * 1.4 *
-0.8 0.6 *0.4 * 0.5 *
PT SE
0.2 0.1 0.8 *
NLAT FR UK IT
4 364 15 4 6
4.6 * 2.0 *2.9 * 1.6 *
4.6 * 2.0 *
1.1 * 1.7 * 2.1 *
1.6 *1.1 * 1.3  * 2.1 * 2.9 *
PT SEIT NLAT FR UK
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5.3. The influence of government wages on 
labour costs in the tradable sector: short 
and long-run effects 
The relation between government and private 
wages is often analysed with reference to the 
possible implications for labour cost conditions in 
the tradable sector, competitiveness, and external 
balance (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Alesina et 
al, 2002; Ardagna, 2004).  
Government wage dynamics in specific euro-area 
countries have been identified among the factors 
underlying competitiveness losses in the pre-EMU 
period (e.g., Blanchard, 2007). Wage growth in the 
government sector could have played a role also in 
the accumulation of external imbalances in EMU 
years, before the crisis. The scatterplot in Graph 17 
relates changes in the current account balance and 
the difference in the growth rate between the 
compensations per employee in the government 
and in the manufacturing sector in the period 
between the establishment of EMU and the crisis. 
It appears that deteriorations in current account 
balances were somewhat more marked in countries 
where government wages were growing at faster 
pace than manufacturing wages. Although such a 
correlation should not be interpreted as causation, 
it speaks in favour of a possible link between 
relative wage growth and the accumulation of 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
Graph 17: Changes in current account balances and 
wage growth difference between  the 
government and manufacturing sector, 1999-
2007 
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Source: Own calculations based on OECD and DG ECFIN 
AMECO Database 
With a view to analyse more systematically the 
short and long-run effects of government wages on 
the tradable sector, a cointegration approach is 
developed linking manufacturing wages to a 
number of determinants, including compensations 
in the government sector. The long-run relation is 
estimated in levels using dynamic ordinary least 
squares (DOLS), while the Error Correction 
Mechanism (ECM) representation allows 
estimating the short-run relation between wage 
growth, shocks in explanatory variables, and the 
deviation from the dynamic long-run relation.  
Estimates are performed on the whole sample of 
countries for which data are available over the 
1980-2013 period. This has not only the advantage 
of gaining degrees of freedom and of increasing 
robustness of results, but allows investigating the 
role of framework conditions in driving the impact 
of government on manufacturing wages by means 
of opportune sample splits. Box 3 illustrates the 
estimation methodology and discusses results in 
detail.  
Over the whole sample, it is found that a large 
share of the variance of manufacturing 
compensations are explained by variables usually 
employed in the estimation of wage equations (i.e., 
the price level, labour productivity, the 
unemployment rate), but also by government 
compensations. Moreover, the significant and 
negative value for the error correction term in the 
ECM equation supports the hypothesis of co-
integration among the variables, namely that there 
is a stable long-run relation among manufacturing 
and government wages, and the remaining 
explanatory variables; it also suggests that 
deviations from such a long-term relation are only 
temporary and get automatically corrected. (34)  
Government wages appear to exert a statistically 
significant effect over manufacturing wages both 
in the long and the short run. The elasticity of 
manufacturing wages with respect to government 
wages is estimated to be in the order of 0.3-0.4, a 
result broadly in line with the one obtained in 
analogous studies (e.g., Afonso and Gomes, 
2008). (35) 
                                                          
(34) It is also found that the reaction of (real) manufacturing 
wages to government wages in symmetric insofar as it is 
unaffected by the fact that government wages may either 
increase or decrease. 
(35) The size of the short-run effects of government on 
manufacturing wages is different from the one estimated 
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through the SVAR model not only because the latter looks 
at private wages generally speaking rather than at 
manufacturing wages, but more fundamentally because the 
two empirical exercises are based on different assumptions 
and their results are thus not comparable.  
 
 
 
Box 3: The long-run relation between manufacturing and general government 
compensations per employee: size and institutions matter
The long-run relationship between manufacturing and government wages is analysed in a panel 
cointegration framework  on an unbalanced panel of the 17 EU countries over the 1980-2013 period. (1) The 
long-run relation should be interpreted as an equilibrium rather than a causal relation. 
The long-run wage equation is specified as:  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠      (1) 
where i and t index country and time respectively, w denotes the level of nominal compensation per employee 
in the manufacturing sector; wp is the level of nominal compensation per general government employee; pr is 
real value added per person employed in the manufacturing sector; u is the unemployment rate; cpi is the 
consumer price index, and ε is the error term. (2) All variables are in logs except for the unemployment rate. 
Compensations in the manufacturing sector are expected to be positively related to government wages, prices 
and labour productivity and negatively related to unemployment. Cointegration is tested using dynamic 
ordinary least squares (DOLS) with one lag and one lead for each regressor and fixed country effects. (3) 
Given equation (1), the short-run (error-correction) wage equation is specified as follows:  
∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃1∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝜃𝜃2∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝜃𝜃3∆𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝜃𝜃4∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠     (2) 
where ê is the lagged error correction term.  
Table 1 shows the results of the long-run (Column 1) and short-run (error-correction) wage equation (Column 
2) estimated on the whole sample. With the exception of the unemployment rate, all the variables exhibit the 
expected sign and are statistically significant. The ECM equation shows that deviations from the long term 
relation are corrected over time (as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of the error correction 
term), which is supportive of co-integration among the variables. Moreover, the short-term response of 
manufacturing wage growth has the expected sign for all the variables and is significant also for the 
unemployment rate. It is found that every 1 per cent increase in general government compensations is 
associated, in the long-run, with a 0.4 per cent increase in manufacturing compensations. Short-run effects are 
slightly weaker at almost 0.25 per cent. 
It is assumed that the greater the importance of the government sector as an employer, the more likely that 
changes to government wages affect average conditions on the market in the presence of cross-sector 
mobility. In order to test for the operation of this market-based channel, the EU sample is split in two groups: 
countries in which the average share of government to total employment is above the whole sample's median 
and countries where it is below the median. Table 2 provides results for the two groups. It is found that 
manufacturing and government compensations share a significant long-run relationship especially in large 
government sectors: for each 1 per cent rise in government wages, manufacturing compensations grow by 0.7 
when the government is a large employer, but by only 0.2 per cent when it is a small employer.  
It is possible that the wage setting modality in the public sector matters for the relationship of manufacturing 
with government wages. To test for this hypothesis, the sample is split between countries where government 
wage setting takes place via collective bargaining and where government wages are set by legislative 
decisions. Countries are classified based on the predominant wage determination regime, as defined in Table 
2. Table 3 displays the results. Whilst there is no major difference across the two regimes in the short-run, 
                                                          
(1) Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovenia are not 
included in the sample because OECD data on general government compensations are unavailable for 1980-2012. 
(2) Nominal compensations per employee in the manufacturing sector are calculated as the ratio of total compensations 
to manufacturing employment; nominal compensations per employee in the general government are calculated as the 
ratio of government wage consumption expenditures to government employment; productivity is gross value added at 
2005 prices per person employed; the consumer price index is the national consumer price index for all times 
(2005=100). The data source is the DG ECFIN AMECO Database, except for general government compensations per 
employee, which are taken from the OECD.  
(3) Fixed effects are necessary because some variables are expressed as index numbers and are thus not comparable 
across countries and because of the need to control for time-invariant country-specific factors.  
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Box (continued) 
 
manufacturing wages appear to be considerably less reactive to productivity over the long-run in countries 
where public wages are set by the government. This result could be linked to the fact that public sector wages 
set unilaterally by the government are less likely to reflect market forces, and thus more likely to weaken the 
link between manufacturing wages and labour productivity. 
 
Table 1: Long-run and short-run relation between manufacturing and general government 
compensations per employee, EU countries 1980-2013 
  (1) (2) 
 Dynamic long-run relation Error Correction Model 
Dependent variable: log of manufacturing compensation per employee, level (long-run relation) and change (ECM) 
 
∆ log government compensations p.e.  0.249*** 
  [7.117] 
∆ log productivity in manufacturing  0.188*** 
  [5.426] 
∆ unemployment rate  -0.00162* 
  [-1.578] 
∆ log consumer price index  0.693*** 
  [19.51] 
Log of consumer price index  0.687***  
 [9.410]  
Log of government compensations p.e.  0.435***  
 [7.968]  
Log of productivity in manufacturing 0.209***  
 [9.004]  
Unemployment rate 0.0057***  
 [3.421]  
Error correction term  -0.122*** 
  [-3.140] 
Constant -1.087*** 0.00715*** 
 [-7.009] [3.273] 
Observations 407 407 
R-squared  0.631 
Number of countries 17 17 
Robust t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Estimation method: dynamic OLS with fixed effects and Newey West standard errors and ECM with standard errors 
robust with respect to heteroskedasticity and non-independence within country clusters. Sample: EU countries, except AT, 
BG, CY, DE, EL, HR, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI.  
 
Table 2: Long-run and short-run relation between manufacturing and government compensations per 
employee, conditional on the size of the government sector, EU countries 1980-2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dynamic long-run relation Error Correction Model 
 
Large 
government 
sector 
Small 
government 
sector 
Large government 
sector 
Small government 
sector 
Dependent variable: log of manufacturing compensation per employee, level (long-run relation) and change (ECM) 
 
∆ log government compensations p.e.   0.214*** 0.288*** 
   [4.186] [8.236] 
∆ log productivity in manufacturing   0.193*** 0.178*** 
   [4.037] [3.411] 
∆ unemployment rate   -0.00193** -0.00137 
 
   
[-2.456] [-1.177] 
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∆ log consumer price index   0.638*** 0.709*** 
   [9.429] [17.90] 
Log of consumer price index  0.416*** 0.938***   
 [4.695] [11.09]   
Log of government compensations p.e.  0.679*** 0.204***   
 [10.65] [3.706]   
Log of productivity in manufacturing 0.172*** 0.214***   
 [5.724] [5.181]   
Unemployment rate 0.00983*** 0.00318   
 [5.592] [1.436]   
Error correction term   -0.176** -0.150** 
   [-3.022] [-2.401] 
Constant -1.018*** -3.082*** 0.0128*** 0.00308 
 [-6.271] [-11.37] [4.651] [0.995] 
Observations 193 214 193 214 
R-squared   0.514 0.740 
Number of countries 8 9 8 9 
Robust t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Estimation method: dynamic OLS with fixed effects and Newey West standard errors and ECM with standard errors 
robust with respect to heteroskedasticity and non-independence within country clusters. Sample: EU countries, except AT, 
BG, CY, DE, EL, HR, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI.  
 
Table 3: Long-run and short-run relation between manufacturing and government compensations per 
employee, conditional on government wage setting model, EU countries 1980-2013 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Dynamic long-run relation Error Correction Model 
 Bargaining Decision Bargaining Decision 
Dependent variable: manufacturing compensations, level and change (log) 
 
∆ government compensations p.e.   0.360*** 0.215*** 
   [6.745] [5.980] 
∆ productivity in manufacturing   0.156** 0.218*** 
   [3.324] [4.935] 
∆ unemployment rate   -0.00210* -0.00155 
   [-2.199] [-1.405] 
∆ consumer price index   0.629*** 0.705*** 
   [6.781] [24.51] 
Consumer price index 0.458*** 0.705***   
 [5.945] [7.019]   
Government compensations p.e. 0.528*** 0.481***   
 [9.669] [5.083]   
Productivity in manufacturing 0.241*** 0.0941**   
 [11.28] [2.191]   
Unemployment rate 0.00676*** 0.00166   
 [3.875] [0.621]   
Error correction term   -0.146*** -0.142** 
   [-3.670] [-2.891] 
Constant -0.753*** -2.367*** 0.00593* 0.00639** 
 [-5.667] [-6.757] [1.905] [2.456] 
Observations 224 183 224 183 
R-squared   0.637 0.643 
Number of countries 8 9 8 9 
Robust t-statistics in brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Estimation method: dynamic OLS with fixed effects and Newey West standard errors and ECM with standard errors 
robust with respect to heteroskedasticity and non-independence within country clusters. Sample: EU countries, except AT, 
BG, CY, DE, EL, HR, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI.   
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The relation goes both ways but when testing the 
relationship in the other direction it is found that 
the long-run elasticity of government wages with 
respect to manufacturing wages is of 0.8, thus 
much stronger than the elasticity of manufacturing 
with respect to general government wages. (36) 
This seems consistent with wage leadership by the 
export sector, as in the so-called Scandinavian 
model of inflation, which is in fact more common 
than leadership by the government sector, as found 
also in the existing literature (Perez and Sanchez, 
2011). . 
By splitting the sample in two groups, in such a 
way as to isolate countries with a relatively large 
government sector from those where the 
government accounts for a smaller share of 
employment, it is found that in the long-run 
government compensations exert an impact on 
manufacturing labour costs that is considerably 
larger where the government sector is above the 
sample's median (i.e., the elasticity being 0.7 
versus 0.2 estimated for countries with a relatively 
small government sector). In the short-run, instead, 
there is no distinctive difference between a large 
and a small government employer (i.e., elasticity in 
the order of 0.2-0.3 in both cases). 
Results show that the long-run effect of 
government wages in countries characterised by a 
"decision" system is marginally stronger than that 
observed in countries with wage setting modalities 
corresponding to a bargaining model, while no 
meaningful difference is found in the short term. It 
is also to notice the weaker relation between 
manufacturing wages and productivity in countries 
characterised by a "decision" wage setting system, 
which is probably linked to the fact that in such a 
case the influence of government on 
manufacturing wages is more likely to induce a 
certain degree of misalignment between 
compensations in the manufacturing sector and 
productivity. 
                                                          
(36) Results of the response of government to manufacturing 
wage levels and growth rates are not shown. The wage 
equation include general government compensations per 
employee as dependent variable and, as regressors, 
compensations per employee in manufacturing, a proxy for 
labour productivity in the government sector, the consumer 
price index and the unemployment rate. 
5.4. Government compensations and fiscal 
consolidation episodes 
Most euro area countries have been recently 
engaged in an effort to reduce and rationalise the 
public wage bill. As compared with previous 
episodes of fiscal consolidations, where the 
reduction in the wage bill was mainly achieved by 
means of freezes or a reduced growth rate in hiring 
and compensations, the impact of the crisis on the 
state of public finances in a number of EU 
countries required more drastic measures.  
Between 2008 and 2013, freezes and cuts in the 
government wage bill were widespread across the 
EU. In addition to freezes and reduction in the real 
value of government compensations, nominal cuts 
in earnings received by government employees 
took place especially in Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain. In some countries, nominal cuts 
concerned only selected categories of employees. 
In several instances, the cuts were concentrated on 
specific indemnities or benefits (including bonuses 
for Christmas and other holydays); in some 
countries, the cuts were implemented in a 
progressive fashion, with stronger cuts for higher-
income employees. 
The exceptional public finance circumstances have 
coincided in some instances with a change in 
established wage setting practices, especially with 
increased reliance on unilateral action by the 
government including in countries with established 
social dialogue and collective bargaining traditions 
(e.g., European Commission, 2013). 
The emergency measures taken by EU 
governments to contain government wage 
expenditure after the crisis have also fallen more 
extensively and effectively on wage rather than on 
employment levels compared with analogous 
consolidation episodes before the crisis.  
Graph 18 reports the average annual percentage 
change in government and manufacturing 
compensations per employee before and after the 
crisis, under alternative fiscal scenarios, i.e., with 
and without presence of major fiscal consolidation 
episodes. By convention, episodes of fiscal 
consolidation are defined as those where the 
structural primary balance improves by at least 1.5 
per cent of GDP in 1 year or at least 3 per cent in 3 
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years, with a minimum of 0.5 per cent 
improvement in each year. Such a definition 
permits to isolate both cases of "cold-shower" 
consolidation episodes and more gradual 
consolidation episodes. 
Graph 18: Average annual percentage change in 
government and manufacturing 
compensations under alternative fiscal 
conditions, EU countries, 1999-2007 and 2008-
2012 
-1.00
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(1)Fiscal consolidations are defined as a change in the 
structural balance of at least 1.5 % of GDP in one year or of 
at least 3 % of GDP over a three year period, with at least 
0.5% improvement in each year. Sample: EU countries 
(excluding AT, BG, CY, DE, EL, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI). 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD and DG ECFIN 
AMECO Database 
The graph shows that before the crisis general 
government compensations have generally been 
growing faster than compensations in the 
manufacturing, independently of whether countries 
were going through fiscal consolidation or not. 
Conversely, starting with the 2008-2009 crisis, 
compensations per employee in the government 
sector grew at a slower pace as compared with 
those in the manufacturing sector, most notably 
during fiscal consolidation episodes. 
It is likely that under conditions of fiscal distress 
not only wage setting practices in the government 
sector are affected, but that also the interplay 
between government and private sector wages is 
altered, an aspect that is neglected in the previous 
analyses. 
With a view to shed light on this possibility, Table 
7 displays correlations between government wage 
growth and manufacturing wage growth under 
alternative fiscal conditions, and differentiating 
between countries with large and small public 
sectors; the underlying assumption that the size of 
government would matter especially during fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
Table 7: Correlation between government and 
manufacturing compensations' growth under 
alternative fiscal conditions, EU 1980-2012 
Consolidation 0.3993*
Non-consolidation 0.8205*
Consolidation
Large public employer 0.8100*
Small public employer 0.1986
Non-consolidation
Large public employer 0.7950*
Small public employer 0.8291*  
(1) Pearson correlation coefficients.  Sample: EU countries 
(excluding AT, BG, CY, DE, EL, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI) over 1980-
2012 (1995-2012 in the case of CZ, EE, HU, SK).  
Fiscal consolidations are defined as a change in the 
structural balance of at least 1.5 % of GDP in one year or of 
at least 3 % of GDP over a three year period, with at least 
0.5%  improvement in each year. For the years where 
structural balance data are not available in the AMECO 
database, the primary cyclically-adjusted budget balance 
is used. Countries are split according to their government 
size on the basis of the average share of government over 
total employment (countries with an average value above 
the median being classified with a large government 
sector). 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from OECD and 
Devries et al (2011). 
 
In line with expectations, the evidence suggests 
that government and manufacturing wages are less 
closely correlated in periods where major 
consolidations take place. This is easily explained 
by the fact that during consolidations government 
wage dynamics are mainly dictated by the 
objective of reducing government deficits, and 
therefore less likely to co-move with those of 
private wages, which instead would be rather 
driven by market forces. However, the evidence 
also shows that in countries with a relatively large 
government sector the correlation remains strong 
also during episodes of fiscal consolidation. This 
finding corroborates and better qualifies the 
previous evidence that the repercussions of 
government wages to the tradable sector are 
stronger in countries where the government 
employs a large fraction of the labour force.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
A proper understanding of the interactions between 
government wages and labour market conditions in 
the private sector is currently of high relevance in 
the EU, as a number of Member States are facing 
the challenge of redressing public finances, while 
at the same time rebalancing their economies, and 
dealing with rising unemployment.  
This paper has reviewed wage setting practices in 
the government sector in the EU, has analysed 
wage differentials between government and private 
sector occupations, and investigated the dynamic 
interactions between public and private sector 
wages.  
A number of relevant findings from the analysis 
can be summarised as follows: 
• Wage setting institutions and practices in the 
government sector vary considerably across the 
EU along several dimensions, including the 
presence, scope and breadth of collective 
bargaining, the degree of centralization, the 
rights of governments and the modes of their 
representation, and union density. A key 
distinction is between countries in which 
government wages are mostly set by legislative 
decision and those where they are set by 
collective bargaining. While Eastern European 
and some Southern European countries tend to 
follow under the former category, Anglo-
Saxon, Nordic and Continental European 
countries plus Italy belong to the latter.  
• Average compensations per employee in the 
government sector are normally higher than in 
the private sector because the composition of 
employment is characterised by a higher 
incidence of high-skill employees. Even after 
controlling for the composition of employment, 
an hourly wage premium for the public sector 
is nonetheless observed in some countries (i.e., 
Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, 
Belgium Italy, while negative public wage 
premia are generally observed in Eastern 
European countries). Still, the results refer to 
2010 and may not incorporate the effects of the 
cuts introduced in a number of EU countries 
over 2011-2013. 
• Correlation analysis indicates that the public 
wage premium is linked to labour market 
institutions (e.g., job security in the private 
sector as measured by EPL indexes), possibly 
because higher compensations are needed to 
make public employment attractive when 
private employment is strongly protected. It 
also appears that wage premia are more 
moderate in countries where the government 
sector employs a relatively large share of the 
labour force, most likely in light of the stronger 
bargaining power of the public employer 
leader, being therefore able to set. 
• SVAR analysis permits to quantify the short-
term interactions between government and 
private wage dynamics and to identify potential 
direct and indirect market-based channels of 
transmission. Results indicate that while 
private wages normally exhibit a significant 
response to government wages, government 
wages are much less reactive to shocks in 
private sector wages.. The impact of 
government wage shocks on private sector 
compensations is estimated to be strong 
especially in Italy, Portugal, Spain, and France.  
• A negative correlation is observed across a 
number of EU countries between the response 
of private wages to government wage shocks 
and the extent of trade openness, corroborating 
the view that high exposure to trade reduces the 
scope for deviations of labour costs from those 
of foreign competitors, which raises the 
resilience of private sector wages to shocks 
originating from the government sector in 
countries in which there is not an explicit 
practice of wage leadership exercised by the 
private (exposed) sector. 
• Spillovers originating from strong dynamics in 
the wages paid in the non-tradable sector, 
notably the government sector, have been 
mentioned among the drivers of losses in 
competitiveness in some EU and euro-area 
countries before the crisis. With a view to shed 
light on and qualify this hypothesis, the relation 
between government compensations and labour 
costs in the tradable sector is analysed by 
means of a co-integration framework, which 
allows also analysing long-run effects on wage 
levels. Across the whole panel of available EU 
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countries, there is evidence of a significant 
long-term relation between government and 
manufacturing wage levels. However, by 
separating the analysis for countries with a 
relatively large and a relatively small 
government sector it appears that this long-run 
relation is much stronger for the former set of 
countries. It also appears that wage setting 
modalities may play a role for the long-run 
relationship between general government and 
manufacturing wages: in countries where 
government wages are to a greater extent 
determined via collective bargaining, 
manufacturing wages are more strongly linked 
to productivity.  
• Recent years have been characterised by 
unprecedented episodes of wage restraint in the 
public sector and by a discontinuation of 
established collective bargaining practices in 
government wage setting in response to the 
emergency situation of public finances in a 
number of EU countries. The analysis shows 
that when dynamics in government wages are 
mainly driven by fiscal consolidation concerns, 
co-movements between government and 
private wages tend to be weaker, although a 
strong link is still found in countries with a 
large government size.  
Limitations in the analysis need not be neglected, 
notably linked to limited availability of statistics 
on government compensations, imperfect cross-
country comparability of data, and robustness of 
results with respect to the methodologies 
employed.  
Despite the above limitations, the analysis sheds 
light on a number of elements that may deserve 
further attention in ongoing policy discussions. 
For its sheer size as an employer, the government 
has a strong influence on the overall labour 
market. The analysis presented in this paper 
confirms that such influence can be quantitatively 
relevant and persistent, notably in countries less 
open to international trade and where government 
employment represents a high share of total 
employment. 
In the years before the crisis, in a number of EU 
countries, imprudent and sub-optimal wage setting 
practices in the government sector may have been 
at the source not only of mounting public finance 
problems and fiscal pro-cyclicality in good times, 
but could have contributed to saw the seeds of 
competitiveness losses spreading to the tradable 
sector and feeding growing external imbalances. 
The response to the current account and public 
finance crisis that materialised in a number of EU 
countries after 2008 included in some cases 
measures to correct government wage trends that 
are dictated by emergency considerations and of 
unprecedented severity, often implying a 
discontinuation of established wage setting 
practices. 
• From a forward-looking perspective, wage 
setting practices in the government sector 
should aim at avoiding the mistakes of the past 
while creating the conditions for enhanced 
public sector efficiency and preserving fiscal 
and macroeconomic stability.  
• The documented presence of non-negligible 
public wage premia is a matter of concern as 
this may imply a persistently sub-optimal 
supply of skilled labour to the private sector, 
with consequences in terms of competitiveness 
and growth potential. While avoiding the 
emergence of such unjustified wage premia is 
certainly an objective in its own right, in light 
of recent pay freezes and cuts in a number of 
EU countries, looking forward it is also 
important to prevent the risk of excessively low 
pay in the government sector for key 
occupations and to ensure the minimum 
necessary quantity and quality of public 
services. From a public management 
perspective, adequate information on 
differences in the pay structure between the 
government and private sector, including wage 
premia estimates could help from this 
veiwpoint. 
• From a dynamic viewpoint, the current 
retrenchment of government wage growth was 
a necessary ingredient of the policy strategy 
followed by EU countries that were mostly 
concerned with the debt crisis. Wage 
moderation in the public sector was functional 
not only to the reduction of fiscal deficits, but, 
in light of the relevant repercussions on the 
private sector labour market, also to the 
preservation of employment and the 
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improvement of competitiveness in the private 
(exposed) sector. While subdued government 
dynamics may still be needed looking forward 
in some EU countries, it is desirable that wage 
setting in the public sector exits from 
emergency mode, with a view to improve 
practices on a sustainable basis and better 
incorporate longer-term considerations.  
• In the above respect, an adequate balance will 
have to be found between the efficiency gains 
permitted by better aligning government pay to 
productivity and labour market conditions, and 
the need to ensure the respect of fiscal targets. 
While bargaining-based, decentralised wage 
setting modalities are more likely to deliver on 
the front of the alignment of wages with labour 
market conditions, the maintenance of adequate 
control from the centre on the overall 
government wage bill helps the achievement of 
budgetary targets. Further work to assess 
alternative ways to achieve a satisfactory trade-
off between these objectives and evaluate best 
practices across EU countries seems deserved. 
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